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SHARP BOUNDS FOR THE ROY MODEL
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Abstract. We analyze the empirical content of the Roy model, stripped down
to its essential features, namely sector specific unobserved heterogeneity and self-
selection on the basis of potential outcomes. We characterize sharp bounds on
the joint distribution of potential outcomes and the identifying power of exclusion
restrictions. The latter include variables that affect market conditions only in one
sector and variables that affect sector selection only. Special emphasis is put on
the case of binary outcomes, which has received little attention in the literature to
date. For richer sets of outcomes, we emphasize the distinction between pointwise
sharp bounds and functional sharp bounds, and its importance, when constructing
sharp bounds on functional features, such as inequality measures. We analyze a
Roy model of college major choice in Canada within this framework, and we take a
new look at the under-representation of women in Science, Technology, Engineering
or Mathematics (STEM).
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Introduction
In a seminal contribution that is now part of the folklore of economics, Roy (1951) proposed a
model of earnings with sorting on sector specific skills. Roy’s objective was to provide a channel by
which skills translate into earnings and to capture the idea that favorable sorting reduces earnings
inequality. The simplicity of this mechanism and the richness of its implications turned the Roy
model into one of the most successful tools in the analysis of environments, where skills and choices
interact: they include the Gronau-Heckman (1974) labor supply model, the unionization model of Lee
(1978), the model of education self-selection proposed by Willis and Rosen (1979), sector selection in
Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), and the Borjas (1987) immigration model. More recently, Lemieux
(1998) revisited the issue of inequality in the unionization model, Mulligan and Rubinstein (2004)
used the Roy model to shed light on the recent evolution of the gender gap, Chandra and Staiger
(2007) to analyze the choice of surgical procedures and Eisenhauer, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2014)
to analyze benefits and costs of educational choices. The list is, of course, far from complete, but
quite sufficient to show the enormous success of the Roy model.
In the original model, skills are jointly log normal and Basu and Ghosh (1978) show that under this
assumption, the joint distribution of skills and the marginal distributions of potential earnings are
identified. Heckman and Honore´ (1990) further show that self-selection does indeed reduce aggregate
inequality when skills are log normal and within sector inequality when skills have a log concave
distribution. Naturally, the effect of self-selection on outcome inequality remains empirically relevant
when skills do not have a log concave distribution. However, the analysis of the nonparametric
version of the Roy model, stripped down to the self-selection mechanism, has long been hampered
by (lack of) identification issues. The Cox (1972) and Tsiatis (1975) comments on non-identifiability
of competing risks imply that any outcome distribution could be rationalized with independent
sector-specific skills, so that the Willis and Rosen (1979) notion of skill hierarchies loses empirical
content1.
One way to resolve this lack of identification issue, pioneered by Heckman and Honore´ (1989,
1990), is to bring in additional information to achieve identification, such as repeated cross sections,
panel data, factor structure, exclusion restrictions and large support assumptions within restricted
specifications of the model. A vast literature, both theoretical and empirical, followed this lead (see
for instance Heckman (2001), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007), Heckman and Taber (2008) or French
and Taber (2011) for recent accounts). Another way to approach the issue, which was pioneered
by Peterson (1976) and which we follow here, is to recognize that, despite the identification failure
because of self-selection, the Roy model is not devoid of empirical content.
1Note that the Cox (1972) and Tsiatis (1975) results rely on absolute continuity of the potential
outcome distributions, which we do not impose here.
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The object of the present article is to characterize this empirical content, with special emphasis
on the joint distribution of potential outcomes. This implies considering distributional features of
outcomes, which are important if one is to evaluate the effect of self-selection on wage inequality,
as Roy initially intended; see Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2006) for a discussion. It further
implies considering joint distributional aspects. As Heckman (1992) noted early on, information on
the joint distribution is necessary to evaluate welfare implications of policy changes to the relative
price of skills on choices and outcomes. Correlation between outcomes can be important to policy
evaluation, as discussed in Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2002), as can the difference between
potential outcomes or the distribution of outcomes conditional on the chosen sector. In all such
cases, the joint distribution of potential outcomes is the relevant object to characterize. We refer
to Heckman (2010), Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), and Abbring and Heckman (2007) for
in-depth discussions of this issue.
We devote a considerable amount of attention to the case with binary outcomes, which we call
the binary Roy model. The reason is twofold. First, the identification failure is starker with binary
outcomes, and the characterization of the joint distribution is easier to derive and explain in the
binary case, before it is extended to the more general cases of discrete, continuous or mixed discrete
and continuous outcomes. Second, the case of discrete outcomes has received very little attention
in the Roy model literature. Most of this literature concerns the case of continuous outcomes and
many applications, where outcomes are discrete, fall outside its scope. They include analysis of the
effects of different training programs on the ability to secure employment, of competing medical
treatments or surgical procedures on survival, of higher education on migration and of competing
policies on schooling decisions in developing countries among numerous others. The Roy model is
still highly relevant to those applications, but very little is known of its empirical content in such
cases.
The simplest version of the model we consider has observed outcomes Y = Y1D + Y0(1 − D),
where (Y0, Y1) are unobserved potential outcomes, and D is the observed sector selection indicator.
The latter satisfies Y1 > Y0 ⇒ D = 1 and Y0 > Y1 ⇒ D = 0, and the self-selection choice D is left
unspecified when Y1 = Y0. In other words, perfectly informed agents choose the sector that yields
strictly higher returns and we know nothing of the way agents randomize, when both outcomes are
identical. The binary Roy model refers to the case, where Y1 and Y0 take values in {0, 1}. This can
be interpreted as a success-failure model, in which perfectly informed agents make the right choice,
in case one sector yields success and the other yields failure. However, we show that it has the same
empirical content as a latent variable version of the binary outcomes model, which could apply to
modelling labor force participation.
We derive sharp bounds for the joint distribution of (Y0, Y1), from which we derive sharp bounds
on potential success probabilities and conditional probabilities. Bounds do not cross, and the model
is not testable, unless we observe variables that affect success in one sector only, conditionally on
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sector choice. We derive sharp bounds on the potential success probabilities in the latter case and
show the bounds can cross. We further investigate the identifying power of exclusion restrictions by
extending the model to allow observation of variables that affect sector selection without affecting
outcomes conditional on selection. This implies a generalization of the selection mechanism, called
generalized Roy model by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007), where sector choice may hinge on more than
just success. We provide sharp bounds on the joint distribution of (Y0, Y1) in that case and derive a
generalization of the bounds in Balke and Pearl (1997) as a by-product, confirming the importance
of characterizing the joint distribution.
When extending the analysis of the binary Roy model to more general outcomes, distributional
issues come to the fore. The classic Peterson (1976) bounds are sharp for P(Y0 ≤ y) and P(Y1 ≤ y),
for each quantile y, but, as noted by Crowder (1991), they do not incorporate monotonicity and
right-continuity restrictions on distribution functions. Hence they entail loss of information, when
the object of interest involves densities, such as hazard rates, or functionals of the distribution,
such as inequality measures. As noted in Honore´ and Lleras-Muney (2006), they also entail loss
of information, when they are used as inputs in the determination of bounds on parameters in
semiparametric versions of the model. We provide a general characterization of the joint distribution
and bounds on the marginal distributions of potential outcomes that are functionally sharp, in the
sense that they incorporate slope restrictions. We apply the latter bounds to derive sharp bounds
on inequality measures, which we show are more informative than would have been obtained from
pointwise sharp bounds on the distributions of potential outcomes, such as Peterson bounds.
In the tradition of Willis and Rosen (1979), Kenny, Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1979) and, more
recently, Eisenhauer, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2014), we analyze returns to education through the
lens of the Roy selection model. It is well documented, since at least James, Alsalam, Conaty,
and To (1989), that major choice is an important determinant of labour market outcomes, and the
literature on the determinants of and the returns to major choice is now substantial. The STEM
(Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) versus non-STEM classification has come to
dominate the debate. We therefore analyze a Roy model of choice of field of sudy, between STEM
and non-STEM degrees, based on data from the Canadian National Graduate Survey (NGS) and
census. We consider a binary Roy and generalized Roy model of major choice, where the target
labour market outcome is to hold a permanent job, or to hold a job related to the field of study,
and a more traditional Roy model, where the target outcome is wage. Our main objective is to
shed some insight onto the under-representation of women in STEM education and even more so in
STEM jobs, the gender gap in STEM labour market outcomes, and the contribution of the STEM
economy to rising wage inequality.
Other related literature. Sharp bounds are derived in binary outcome models with a binary
endogenous regressor in Chesher (2010), Shaikh and Vytlacil (2005, 2011), Chiburis (2010), Jun,
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Pinkse, and Xu (2010) and Mourifie´ (2011) under a variety of assumptions, which all rule out sec-
tor specific unobserved heterogeneity. Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) provide identification
conditions for a version of the binary Roy model, where sector specific unobserved heterogeneity fol-
lows a factor structure. Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2013) derive sharp bounds for instrumental
variable models of discrete choice. Balke and Pearl (1997) propose sharp bounds for the average
treatment effect with binary endogenous treatment and a binary instrument. Manski and Pepper
(2000) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) refine them with additional monotonicity assumptions and
extend them beyond binary instruments. Huber, Laffers, and Mellace (2015) propose inference on
bounds in treatment effects models with Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013) type correction, as
we do here.
Bedford and Meilijson (1997) consider a model of competing risks, which is related, but different
from our model (as explained in the text) and they show that their marginal bounds are functionally
sharp, using the theory of monotone equimeasurable rearrangements of Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya
(1952). The latter was applied in a context of selection on observables by Heckman, Smith, and
Clements (1997), with identification of marginals and resulting Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds on the
joint distribution of potential outcomes (see also Fan and Zhu (2010)). Here, we derive simple
functional sharp bounds on the joint distribution of potential outcomes (Y0, Y1). We do so with
an appeal to a multivariate extension of the theory of monotone equimeasurable rearrangements,
namely, the theory of optimal transport, an account of which can be found in Villani (2003). The
theory of optimal transport was previously applied to partial identification issues in Galichon and
Henry (2006, 2009, 2011) and specific results in the latter are directly applied here. In the special
case of discrete outcomes and the accelerated failure time model of Cox (1972), our bounds provide
a characterization of the implicitely defined bounds in Honore´ and Lleras-Muney (2006) in the form
of a set of inequalities.
Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) derive bounds on earnings inequality based on the Mandelbrot (1962)
factor model version of the Roy mechanism. Sharp bounds on inequality measures for the potential
outcome distributions are discussed in Vasquez-Alvarez, Melenberg, and van Soest (2003), Blundell,
Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007) and Stoye (2010). Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir
(2007) look specifically at the interquantile range, while Stoye looks at a more general family of
measures. Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007) and Stoye (2010) consider general models
with treatment on unobservables. In the case of the Roy model, we encounter the same issue that
pointwise bounds on the potential distributions do not deliver sharp bounds on the interquantile
range.
Arcidiacono (2004) and Beffy, Fouge`re, and Maurel (2012) are among the recent investigations
of major choice. More references can be found in the survey of research on heterogeneous human
capital investments by Altonji, Blom, and Meghir (2012). The gender gap in STEM labour market
outcomes is higlighted by Zafar (2013) and Hunt, Garant, Herman, and Munroe (2013). We follow
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Boudarbat and Montmarquette (2007) and Lemieux (2015) in the use of Canada’s National Graduate
Survey to study determinants and consequences of the choice of major.
Outline. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 details the general frame-
work of analysis. Section 2 concerns sharp bounds in the binary simple and generalized Roy models.
Section 3 derives functional sharp bounds for the Roy model with mixed discrete-continuous out-
comes. Section 4 applies the derived bounds to the analysis of major choice in Canada. The last
section concludes. Proofs of the main results are collected in the appendix.
1. Analytical framework
We adopt the framework of the potential outcomes model Y = Y1D + Y0(1 − D), where Y is
an observed scalar outcome, D is an observed selection indicator, which takes value 1 if Sector 1
is chosen, and 0 if Sector 0 is chosen, and Y1, Y0, are unobserved potential outcomes. Heckman
and Vytlacil (1999) trace the genealogy of this model and we refer to them for terminology and
attribution. The object of interest is the joint distribution of (Y0, Y1) and features thereof. Since Y
and D are observed, the joint distribution of (Y,D) is assumed known.
We strip the model down to its self-selection mechanism, where agents are perfectly informed of
the joint distribution of their potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) in both sectors and choose the sector that
maximizes outcomes, so that D = 1 when Y1 > Y0 and D = 0 if Y1 < Y0. The model is silent on
the tie-breaking mechanism agents use in case Y1 = Y0. As is customary in such frameworks, the
assumption that agents are perfectly informed is intended to reflect, within a simple static model,
the result of dynamic adjustments and learning on the one hand, and to put in stark relief the
difference between the agents’ and the analyst’s information sets, on the other hand.
We summarize the model with the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Potential outcomes). Observed outcomes are the realizations of a random variable
Y satisfying Y = Y1D+Y0(1−D), where (Y0, Y1) is a pair of possibly dependant unobserved random
variables and D is an observed indicator variable.
Assumption 2 (Selection). The selection indicator satisfies Y1 > Y0 ⇒ D = 1, Y1 < Y0 ⇒ D = 0.
Individuals choose the sector that yields higher outcome, when Y1 6= Y0. Their choice criterion
is unspecified if Y1 = Y0. When outcomes are discrete, the possibility of ties has to be considered.
More generally, in a Roy model of earnings, the possibility of equal earnings in both sectors has
to be entertained, if wage setters propose contracts that pool different skill levels, for instance. If
the probability of ties is non zero, the Roy model specification described here is different from the
specification of traditional competing risks models, contrary to the generally held belief that Roy
and competing risks models are identical, up to sign convention. The model we consider here is
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tuned to economic applications, where the sector selection is unknown, when both sectors yield the
same outcome. Hence, we identify P(Yd ≤ y,D = d), for d = 0, 1, but not P(Yd ≤ y, Yd > Y1−d).
All we know is that P(Yd ≤ y, Yd > Y1−d) ≤ P(Yd ≤ y,D = d) ≤ P(Yd ≤ y, Yd ≥ Y1−d). In the
competing risks analysis of Bedford and Meilijson (1997), on the other hand, P(Y1 ≤ y, Y1 > Y0),
P(Y0 ≤ y, Y1 < Y0) and P(Y1 ≤ y, Y1 = Y0) are all assumed identified.
The Roy model, in the form of Assumptions 1 and 2 has strong implications for the relation be-
tween actual outcome distributions and counterfactual outcome distributions. More precisely, actual
distributions dominate counterfactual ones stochastically at the first order, namely Assumption 2
implies
P (Yd ≤ y|D = d) ≤ P (Y1−d ≤ y|D = d) for all y ∈ R. (1.1)
The stochastic dominance relation (1.1) retains information about the marginal distributions of
potential outcomes Y0 and Y1, but, as we shall see, significant information about the joint distribution
of (Y0, Y1) is lost if one considers only the reduced form implication (1.1) rather than the full structure
of selection.
The whole analysis is understood to be conditional on a set of observed covariates, which will
be omitted from the notation, unless they are excluded from one of the channels in the model. We
shall consider the possibility of observing variables that affect one potential outcome only. Under
Assumption 2, the possibility of observing variables that affect selection without affecting potential
outcomes is restricted to the case Y0 = Y1, so we’ll consider an extension, where sector choice may be
driven by additional factors, both observable and unobservable, beyond the difference in outcomes.
We shall use the notation Xd to denote the vector of observable variables (if any) that enter in
the determination of Yd, but not Y1−d, and Z for the vector of observable variables (if any) that
affect sector selection, but not outcomes conditional on selection. Since there is some ambiguity in
notation, it is worth stressing the fact that both vectors X0 and X1 are observed, independently of
the chosen sector, unlike Y0, which is only observed if D = 0 and Y1, when D = 1.
Assumption 3 (Exclusions). The random vectors X0, X1 and Z denote vectors of observed variables
(when they exist) such that Yd ⊥⊥ X1−d, for d = 0 and 1, and (Y0, Y1) ⊥⊥ Z.
Excluded variables Xd are variables that change the price of skills relevant for one sector without
affecting the price of skills in the other, as discussed in Heckman and Honore´ (1990). Typical exam-
ples would include sector specific shifters of labor market conditions, as in Heckman and Sedlacek
(1985, 1990). Excluded variables Z are more akin to typical instrumental variables, and examples
within Roy models include parental education in Willis and Rosen (1979), distance to a college in
Eisenhauer, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2014) and attendance in a Catholic high school in Altonjii,
Elder, and Taber (2005). The exclusions of Assumption 3 are conditional on a set of observed co-
variates, as noted above. Note that the marginal potential outcome distributions Yd, d = 0, 1, are
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each marginally independent of X1−d, whereas the joint distribution of (Y0, Y1) is independent of
Z. This distinction will be crucial when deriving sharp bounds for joint and for marginal potential
outcome distributions.
2. Sharp bounds for the binary Roy model
A great deal of the intuition for the characterization that we propose for the Roy model can be
developed with the simplest version, where Y0 and Y1 are both binary outcomes. It models success or
failure in securing a desired outcome, and the way it depends on a binary choice of treatment. In the
case of college major choice, considered in Section 4, Y1 will model the ability to secure permanent
employment, if the degree or the major is classified as STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and
Math), whereas Y0 will model the ability to secure employment with a non-STEM degree or major.
Definition 1 (Binary Roy model). A model satisfying Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, with Y0, Y1 ∈ {0, 1},
is called binary Roy model.
An alternative way of defining a binary outcomes model, which shares the main features of the
Roy model, i.e., self-selection on unobserved heterogeneity, involves latent potential outcomes. It is
identical to the Roy model, except that potential outcomes are censored.
Definition 2 (Alternative binary Roy model). Observed outcomes are the realizations of a random
variable Y satisfying Y = Y1D + Y0(1−D), where
(1) potential outcomes satisfy Yd = 1{Y
∗
d > 0}, for d = 0, 1, for a pair of possibly dependant
unobserved random variables (Y ∗0 , Y
∗
1 ),
(2) D is an observed indicator variable, satisfying Y ∗1 > Y
∗
0 ⇒ D = 1, Y
∗
1 < Y
∗
0 ⇒ D = 0.
The alternative binary Roy model of Definition 2 can be interpreted in two ways. First, it is
equivalent to a model with Y = 1{Y ∗ > 0} and Y ∗ satisfies a Roy model. Hence, it can be
interpreted as a censored Roy model. The latent variables may be continuous variables, such as
wages, and the analyst only observes whether or not they fall above or below a threshold. Other
examples include examination grades, which are unobserved, except for the pass or fail outcome.
Second, the actual outcome may be binary and be the result of a two-stage decision by the agent.
In a first stage, they choose the sector of activity, with their choice of college major, for instance.
In a second stage, they decide whether or not to work. The labor supply decision hinges on the
difference between wage and reservation wage in the chosen sector. Then, Y ∗d can be interpreted
2
as the difference between wage in Sector d and reservation wage in Sector d. If reservation wages
are equal in both sectors, the model still conforms to the simple Roy incentive mechanism, where
wages are the only determinant of sector choice. If reservation wages differ in both sectors, however,
2We thank a referee for pointing this interpretation out.
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sector selection internalizes possibly non-pecuniary costs and benefits of each sector, as in the recent
analysis of the generalized Roy model in Eisenhauer, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2014).
Despite their distinct interpretations, it will be shown that sharp bounds for the joint distribution
of (Y0, Y1) are identical in both models, so that both models carry exactly the same information on
the joint distribution of censored potential outcomes. They also share the reduced form implication
E(Yd − Y1−d|D = d) ≥ 0, (2.1)
which is a specialization of (1.1) to the binary case, and can be interpreted as a condition of chosen
sector advantage. However, we show below that the reduced form condition contains strictly less
information on the joint distribution of potential outcomes than the structural models of Definitions 1
and 2 do.
The binary Roy models of Definitions 1 and 2 differ fundamentally from binary outcome model
analyzed in Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) and Mourifie´ (2011) in that they allow for sector specific
unobserved heterogeneity. The spirit of the Roy model is to allow skills to be heterogeneous and
differentiated, so that non trivial sorting occurs. To clarify the point, note that latent potential
outcomes in the alternative binary Roy model can be written as Y ∗d = 1{f(d,X, ud) > 0}, where f
is an unknown measurable structural function, X is the vector of observed heterogeneity variables
that we condition on, and ud is a vector of d-sector specific unobserved heterogeneity. This is in
contrast with a model without sector specific unobserved heterogeneity, which would take the form
Y ∗d = 1{f(d,X) > u}, where the vector of skills u is the same for both sectors (which would be
more adequately interpreted as both values of the treatment). This has important implications for
the bounds on the joint distribution of (Y0, Y1). In particular, the threshold crossing assumption
of ? does not generate the sharpening of the bounds obtained in Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) and
Mourifie´ (2011).
The lack of identification of the model comes from the fact that the mapping from observed
sector and success to unobserved skills is not single valued. We know that when success in Sector 1
is observed, potential outcomes can be either (Y0 = 1, Y1 = 1), i.e., success in both sectors, or
(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1), i.e., success in Sector 1 only. Hence the identified probability of that a random
individual in the population chooses Sector 1 and succeeds will not be sufficient to identify the
probability of succeeding in Sector 1. What we do know, however, is that Y = 0 is observed if and
only if the individual has neither the skills to succeed in Sector 0 nor in Sector 1. Hence, P(Y0 =
0, Y1 = 0) = P(Y = 0). Moreover, if the individual has the skills to succeed in Sector 0, but not in
Sector 1, then, success in Sector 0 will be observed, so that P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 0).
Symmetrically, if the individual has the skills to succeed in Sector 1, but not in Sector 0, then,
success in Sector 1 will be observed, so that P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 1).
The discussion above shows that the expressions hold. Showing sharpness of these bounds is
more involved, and the proof of the Theorem 1 is given in the appendix, together with a more
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fastiduous statement of the theorem, with a rigorous and unambiguous definition of sharp bounds in
this context. Note that the bounds can take the form of an equality in case upper and lower bounds
coincide.
Theorem 1 (Sharp bounds for the binary Roy model). The following equality and inequalities
provide a set of sharp bounds for the joint distribution of potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) in the binary
Roy model (Definition 1) and the alternative binary Roy model (Definition 2) in the absence of
exclusion restrictions.
0 ≤ P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 0)
0 ≤ P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 1)
P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0) = P(Y = 0)
(2.2)
The bounds in Theorem 1 summarize all the information in the (alternative) binary Roy model
about the joint distribution of potential outcomes. From these bounds, sharp bounds on the
marginals, which are akin to traditional bounds on average treatment outcomes, can be recovered.
Combining the equality and inequalities of (2.2), we obtain Manski bounds3
P(Y = 1, D = 0) ≤ EY0 ≤ P(Y = 1) and P(Y = 1, D = 1) ≤ EY1 ≤ P(Y = 1). (2.3)
However, from the latter only, (2.2) cannot be recovered, so that information on the joint distribution
is lost. The bounds on the average sector difference are then
−P(Y = 1, D = 0) ≤ E(Y1 − Y0) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 1). (2.4)
The sharp bounds of Theorem 1 emphasize the fact that, despite the literature on non identification
of competing risks, starting with Cox (1972) and Tsiatis (1975), the Roy model does in fact contain
non trivial information about the joint distribution of potential outcomes, hence of skills, or more
generally, of sector specific unobserved heterogeneity. Information about the joint distribution of
skills is important on many counts. Correlation between outcomes across sectors provides useful
information to inform policies that alter the relative price of skills in the two sectors. The sharp
bounds of Theorem 1 yield sharp bounds on the probability of success in one sector, conditional on
knowing the outcome in the other sector. Thus, P(Y1 = 1|Y0 = 0) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 1)/[1 − P(Y =
1, D = 0)] and similarly for the other cases. Information on the joint distribution is also necessary
for bounds on the distribution of Y1 − Y0, as well as on the distribution of outcomes conditional
on choice, to investigate the proportion of individuals who strictly benefit from sector choice, for
instance.
Exclusion restrictions. An important feature of Theorem 1 is that the binary Roy and the alternative,
despite their different structures and interpretations, convey exactly the same information on the
joint distribution of potential outcomes. Another important feature is the non testability of the
3See for example Manski (2007), Section 7.5.
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model without exclusion restrictions or additional structure, since the bounds in (2.3) cannot cross.
In order to introduce testability, we now investigate the implications of exclusion restrictions. We first
investigate the implications of observing a variable Z that can shift sector choice without affecting
potential outcomes, conditional on the selected sector. In the context of our application to major
choice in college, parental education level or the parent’s major choice are reasonable candidates as
variables likely to shift choice of major without affecting salary conditionally on the chosen sector.
First, it is important to emphasize, that given the Roy selection mechanism that imposes D = 1
when Y1 > Y0 and D = 0 when Y1 < Y0, a selection shifter Z can only affect the model in case
of ties Y1 = Y0. As a result, Y is independent of Z, but (Y,D) is not jointly independent of Z,
so that the bounds in Theorem 1 can be sharpened using variation in P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z) and
in P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z). We state the sharpened bounds as corollaries of Theorem 1, although,
strictly speaking, Theorem 1 is the special case of Corollary 1 when Z is constant. Recall that the
support Supp(Z) of a random vector Z is the set of points, whose neighbourhoods all have positive
probability.
Corollary 1. The following equality and inequalities provide a set of sharp bounds for the joint
distribution of potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) in the binary Roy model (Definition 1) and the alternative
binary Roy model (Definition 2) in the absence of sector specific covariates.
0 ≤ P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z)
0 ≤ P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z)
P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0) = P(Y = 0)
for almost all z in Supp(Z).
The sharpened bounds are proven to be sharp in the Appendix and illustrated in Figure 2. In
order to state the sharpened bounds for probabilities of success in each sector and expected sector
difference, we need additional notation.
Assumption 4. The following expressions are well defined.
q10 := inf{ P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}
q11 := inf{ P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}
q¯10 := sup{ P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}
q¯11 := sup{ P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}.
Denoting pij := P(Y0 = i, Y1 = j), for i, j = 0, 1, the sharp bounds of Corollary 1 can be written,
under Assumption 4, as p10 ≤ q10, p01 ≤ q11 and p00 = P(Y = 0). The first two are intersection
bounds, so that inference can be carried out with the method proposed in Chernozhukov, Lee, and
Rosen (2013).
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Corollary 2. Given Z satisfying Assumptions 3 and 4, sharp bounds for the pair (EY0,EY1) in the
binary (and alternative) Roy model are given by:
q¯10 ≤ EY0 ≤ P(Y = 1) and q¯11 ≤ EY1 ≤ P(Y = 1).
The terminology sharp bounds for the pair (EY0,EY1) used in Corollary 2 makes an important
distinction with sharp bounds for each of EY0 and EY1. It means that the bounds define the identified
set for the vector (EY0,EY1), namely, any value of that vector satifying the bounds can be achieved
as a solution of the model for some distribution of the observable variables (Y,D). In other words, no
value for the pair (EY0,EY1) that satisfies both equations can be rejected solely on the basis of the
model specification. This allows us to readily obtain sharp bounds for the average sector difference
as
−q10 ≤ E(Y1 − Y0) ≤ q11.
It is clear that the bounds in Corollaries 1 and 2 cannot cross, hence that the Roy model is not
testable solely on the basis of variation in Z. This is due to the fact that variation in Z only affects
sector selection in case potential outcomes are the same in both sectors.
We now investigate the implications of observing sector specific covariates, denoted X0 and X1
in Assumption 3, and which are interpreted as variables that shift market conditions in one sector
without affecting the other. In a narrow partial equilibrium sense, exogenous and unanticipated (at
the time of college major choice) variation in the gross number of STEM jobs could be thought to
affect only conditions for success in securing employment with a STEM degree, without affecting
success in securing employment with a non STEM degree.
The classical way to derive bounds under an exclusion restriction is to observe that E(Yd|X1−d) =
EYd under Assumption 3, so that the bounds (2.3) hold for all values of X1−d. We contribute to the
literature here, in showing sharpness of these bounds for the binary (and alternative binary) Roy
model. Conditioning on all non excluded variables remains implicit throughout.
Corollary 3 (Marginal bounds with sector specific covariates). For any (x0, x1) in the support of
(X0, X1), sharp bounds for the pair (E(Y0|X0 = x0),E(Y1|X1 = x1)) in the binary (and alternative
binary) Roy model are given by:
P(Y = 1, D = 0|X0 = x0, X1 = x˜1) ≤ E(Y0|X0 = x0) ≤ P(Y = 1|X0 = x0, X1 = x˜1),
for almost all x˜1 ∈ Supp(X1|X0 = x0), and
P(Y = 1, D = 1|X0 = x˜0, X1 = x1) ≤ E(Y1|X1 = x1) ≤ P(Y = 1|X0 = x˜0, X1 = x1),
for almost all x˜0 ∈ Supp(X0|X1 = x1).
As before, sharpness for the pair means that the bounds define the identified set for the vector
(E(Y0|X0 = x0),E(Y1|X1 = x1)), namely, any value of that vector satifying the bounds can be
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achieved as a solution of the model for some distribution of the observable variables (Y,D) conditional
on (X0 = x0, X1 = x1). In other words, no value for the pair (E(Y0|X0 = x0),E(Y1|X1 = x1)) that
satisfies both equations can be rejected solely on the basis of the model specification. The bounds
are well-known, but the joint sharpness result is new. As before, the bounds of Corollary 3 are
intersection bounds, so that inference can be carried out with the method proposed in Chernozhukov,
Lee, and Rosen (2013).
A salient consequence of Corollary 3 is the fact that the binary Roy model can be rejected when
the bounds cross, i.e., when there is a value x1 in the support of X1 and two values x
1
0 and x
2
0 in
the support of X0 conditional on X1 = x1, such that P(Y = 1, D = 1|X0 = x
1
0, X1 = x1) > P(Y =
1|X0 = x
2
0, X1 = x1) or a value x0 in the support of X0 and two values x
1
1 and x
2
1 in the support
of X1 conditional on X0 = x0, such that P(Y = 1, D = 0|X0 = x0, X1 = x
1
1) > P(Y = 1|X0 =
x0, X1 = x
2
1). The reduced form implication (2.1) of the binary Roy model is sufficient to recover
bounds of Corollary 3, however, without the structural form, bounds on the joint distribution of
potential outcomes in Theorem 1 cannot be recovered. As discussed before, information on the joint
distribution is important, if one is interested in success probability conditional on outcome in the
other sector. With exclusion restrictions, Corollary A.2 in the appendix gives sharp bounds for those
quantities.
Identification of the pair (E(Y0|X0 = x0),E(Y1|X1 = x1)) can be achieved as a simple implication
of the previous result if there is x˜1 ∈ Supp(X1|X0 = x0) such that P(Y = 1, D = 1|X0 = x0, X1 =
x˜1) = 0 and x˜0 ∈ Supp(X0|X1 = x1) such that P(Y = 1, D = 0|X0 = x˜0, X1 = x1) = 0, in
which case lower and upper bounds coincide in Corollary 3. This identification result is akin to the
identification at infinity of Heckman (1990).
Generalized binary Roy model. In case the bounds of Corollary 3 cross and the binary Roy model
is rejected, a natural extension of the model, we call generalized binary Roy model, following the
terminology of Heckman and Vytlacil (2007), allows for additional observable and unobservable
heterogeneity variables to affect sector choice, beyond the difference in outcomes.
Definition 3 (Generalized binary Roy model). A model satisfying Assumptions 1 and 3, with
Y0, Y1 ∈ {0, 1}, is called generalized binary Roy model.
The choice of terminology is important here, as it emphasizes the structural objective. The model
could also be called endogenous treatment effect model. However, we emphasize the interpretation
of D as a sector selection indicator, as in the Roy model, and allow this sector selection mechanism
to involve additional variables. With the choice of terminology, we also emphasize the objective of
deriving sharp bounds for the joint distribution of potential outcomes and from those bounds on
the joint distribution, bounds on the parametric or semiparametric features of a chosen structure
for the pair (Y0, Y1) can subsequently be derived.
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Starting with no information on selection, all the analyst knows, when observing failure in Sector
d is that the individual does not have the skill to succeed in Sector d. The analyst has no information
on the individual’s skill in the other sector, as opposed to the case of Roy selection analyzed before.
Conversely, an individual with the skills to succeed in both sectors will be observed as having
succeeded, in one or the other sector, so that P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 1) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 0)+P(Y = 1, D = 1).
An individual with the skill to succeed in Sector 0, but not in Sector 1, will be observed as having
succeeded in Sector 0 or as having failed in Sector 1 (the latter was ruled out under Assumption 1).
Hence P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 0) + P(Y = 0, D = 1) and similarly for the remaining two
cases.
These bounds, however, do not fully characterize the information on the joint distribution of
potential outcomes (Y0, Y1). To see why, consider the probability of success in Sector 1, P(Y1 = 1).
Using the bounds of the previous paragraph to bound the probability of success in Sector 1 would
yield
P(Y1 = 1) = P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) + P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 1)
≤ [P(Y = 0, D = 0) + P(Y = 1, D = 1)] + [P(Y = 1, D = 0) + P(Y = 1, D = 1)].
However, we have more information than this latter bound, since we know that success in Sector 1
cannot occur when the individual doesn’t have the skills to succeed in Sector 1, so that P(Y1 = 1) ≤
1 − P(Y = 0, D = 1). In addition, observing success in Sector 1 necessary implies that the agent
has the skills required for Sector 1, hence P(Y1 = 1) ≥ P(Y = 1, D = 1). The latter two bounds
constitute the traditional bounds on EY1 in the literature.
Under Assumption 3 with a variable Z affecting sector selection, but not success conditional
on selection, Z is independant of the joint distribution of potential outcomes, so that variation in
Z sharpens the bounds discussed above. As in Theorem 1, the difficulty is not proving that the
bounds hold, but that they are sharp, hence summarize all the information in the model. In other
words, they characterize the empirical content of the model of Definition 3. The proof is given in
the appendix, together with a more fastidious, but completely unambiguous and rigorous statement,
which properly defines the notion of sharp bounds in this context.
Theorem 2 (Sharp bounds for the generalized binary Roy model). Sharp bounds for the joint
distribution of potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) in the generalized binary Roy model of Definition 3 are
given by
0 ≤ P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 1) ≤ P(Y = 1|Z = z)
0 ≤ P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0) ≤ P(Y = 0|Z = z)
0 ≤ P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) ≤ P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z) + P(Y = 0, D = 1|Z = z)
0 ≤ P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) ≤ P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = z) + P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z),
(2.5)
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and
P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z) ≤ P(Y0 = 1) ≤ 1− P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = z)
P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z) ≤ P(Y1 = 1) ≤ 1− P(Y = 0, D = 1|Z = z)
(2.6)
for almost all z in Supp(Z).
Since the probabilities on the left-hand-side of the inequalities in Theorem 2 sum to 1, the easiest
way to represent and visualize the identified set is on the 3-simplex, as we discuss in the appendix.
For this, we need to make sure that the infimum (resp. supremum) over the support of Z of the
conditional probabilities on the right (resp. left)-hand-side are attained. This is the object of the
following assumption.
Assumption 5. The following expressions are well defined.
q1 := inf{ P(Y = 1|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}
q0 := inf{ P(Y = 0|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}
q10−01 := inf{ P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z) + P(Y = 0, D = 1|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}
q00−11 := inf{ P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = z) + P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)},
q¯10 := sup{ P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}
q¯00 := sup{ P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}
q¯11 := sup{ P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}
q¯01 := sup{ P(Y = 0, D = 1|Z = z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}.
Denoting pij := P(Y0 = i, Y1 = j), for i, j = 0, 1, the sharp bounds of Theorem 2 can be written,
under Assumption 5, as p11 ≤ q1, p00 ≤ q0, p10 ≤ q10−01, p01 ≤ q00−11, q¯10 ≤ p11 + p10 ≤ 1 − q¯00
and q¯11 ≤ p11 + p01 ≤ 1 − q¯01. As before, these are intersection bounds, so that inference can be
carried out with the method proposed in Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013).
The bounds of Theorem 2 allow us to derive closed form solutions to the sharp bounds for the
pair (EY0,EY1) under the exclusion restriction that Z affects sector selection, but not potential
outcomes, as in Theorem 2. We thereby generalize the celebrated result of Balke and Pearl (1997),
as our result specializes to theirs, when Z takes only two values. To understand how the bounds are
derived, consider the case of EY1. The latter is already bounded by (2.6). However, these bounds
can be refined using (2.5) simply by noting that EY1 = P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 1) + P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) =
1− [P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0)+ P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0)]. The latter observation yields an additional lower bound
and an additional upper bound for EY1 and similarly for EY0. Again, the proof of sharpness of the
resulting bounds is presented in the appendix.
Corollary 4. Under Assumption 1 and given a random vector Z satisfying Assumptions 3 and 5,
the following are sharp bounds for the pair (EY0,EY1).
max(q¯10, 1− q0 − q00−11) ≤ EY0 ≤ min(1− q¯00, q1 + q10−01),
max(q¯11, 1− q0 − q10−01) ≤ EY1 ≤ min(1− q¯01, q1 + q00−11).
As before, the terminology sharp bounds for the pair (EY0,EY1) used in Corollary 4 makes an
important distinction with sharp bounds for each of EY0 and EY1. Sharpness for the pair means
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that the bounds of Corollary 4 define the identified set for the vector (EY0,EY1), namely, any value
of that vector satifying the bounds of Corollary 4 can be achieved as a solution of the model for
some distribution of the observable variables (Y,D) conditional on Z. The advantage of sharpness
for the pair is that sharp bounds for the difference E(Y1 − Y0) can be derived immediately, as
max(q¯11, 1 − q0 − q10−01) −min(1 − q¯00, q1 + q10−01) ≤ E(Y1 − Y0) ≤ min(1 − q¯01, q1 + q00−11) −
max(q¯10, 1 − q0 − q00−11). This sharpens the instrumental variable version of the ? bounds, based
on (2.6), used in ? to analyze the impact of the Swan-Ganz Chaterization.
Theorem 2, with its characterization of the information on the joint distribution of potential
outcomes, delivers bounds on several other policy relevant quantities.
Proportion who benefit. Bounds on the proportion of individuals who strictly benefit from the choice
of Sector 1, i.e., P(Y1 > Y0), are derived in Appendix A.4.1. As discussed in Heckman (2010), this
quantity measures support for a treatment policy in place, within the political economy framework
of Persson and Tabellini (2000). The bounds are more informative than would have been obtained
from plugging marginal bounds of Corollary 4 into Fre´chet bounds, hence the importance of sharp
bounds on the joint distribution of potential outcomes. Bounds on P(Y1 ≥ Y0) can be smilarly
derived, yielding a framework to test the Roy selection mechanism of Assumption 2 against an
alternative, where agents select the sector of activity according to criteria beyond the difference in
observable outcomes. Indeed, under the hypothesis of a Roy selection mechanism, P(D = 1) must
lie above the lower bound for P(Y1 > Y0) and below the upper bound for P(Y1 ≥ Y0).
Ex-post regret. Bounds on the conditional distribution P(Y1 = 1|Y0 = 0, D = 0) are derived in
Appendix A.4.2. As the probability of success in Sector 1 conditional on having failed in Sector 0,
it can be interpreted as measuring ex-post regret in the terminology of ?.
Distributional mobility. Bounds on the conditional distribution P(Y1 = 1|Y0 = 0) are derived in Ap-
pendix A.4.3. This quantity allows to track movements of individuals as the result of counterfactual
policies.
Average gain from the selected sector. Since the Roy selection mechanism imposes better outcomes
in the selected sector than in the counterfactual, as in (2.1), it is natural to ask, whether (2.1) holds
within the generalized Roy framework of this section. We therefore derive bounds on the quantities
E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1) and E(Y0 − Y1|D = 0), which measure the average gains from selecting into
a particular sector of activity. In the terminology of treatment effects, they measure the average
treatment on the treated. Bounds are derived in Appendix A.4.4.
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3. Functional sharp bounds for the Roy model
Extending the analysis to richer sets of outcomes, including mixed discrete and continuous po-
tential outcomes does not remove the lack of identification issue in the Roy model (and the related
competing risks model). The range of observables is richer, but so is the object of interest, i.e., the
joint distribution of potential outcomes. Given partial observability and endogenous sector selection,
the Roy model is essentially partially identified. Results obtained in the form of sharp bounds on
the joint distribution of potential outcomes and the methods used to derive them are analogous to
the corresponding results and methods in the binary case, except in one important respect. When
considering distributional aspects, such as inequality, the distinction between pointwise bounds and
functional bounds is crucial as described below.
Functional bounds. Consider the Roy model of Section 1, under Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose,
for the sake of discussion in this section only, that (Y0, Y1) has absolutely continuous distribution
with respect to Lebesgue measure, so that the probability of ties is zero. The latter will be relaxed
in the results below, which leave the distribution of (Y0, Y1) unrestricted. Bounds on the marginal
distributions of potential outcomes can be derived very easily as follows. For any real number y,
P(Yd ≤ y) = P(Yd ≤ y,D = d) + P(Yd ≤ y,D = 1− d).
The first term on the right-hand-side is identified. The second term on the right-hand-side is bounded
below by P(Y1−d ≤ y,D = 1 − d), as a result of (1.1), and above by P(D = 1 − d). The resulting
bounds were shown by Peterson (1976) to be pointwise sharp for the marginal distributions of
potential outcomes, in the sense that any pair of distributions of potential outcomes that satisfy
the bounds for a given fixed y, can be obtained from some joint distribution of observable variables
(Y,D) under the assumptions of the Roy model. However, as Crowder (1991) pointed out, there are
additional non redundant cross quantile restrictions, namely, for all y ≥ x, P(x < Yd ≤ y) ≥ P(x <
Yd ≤ y,D = d). If the object of interest involves densities, such as the hazard rate, or functional
features, such as inequality measures, the difference between the latter bounds and pointwise bounds
can be considerable. Indeed, combining Peterson bounds involves an additional term −P(D = 1−d)
in the lower bound. This difference arises because the monotonicity of the distribution function is
not factored in. Graphically, the difference between pointwise bounds and functional bounds can
be highlighted on Figure 1. A candidate distribution function for Yd that is drawn through the two
points (y˜1, q1) and (y˜2, q2) can lie betwen the curves P(Y ≤ y) and P(Y ≤ y,D = d)+P(D = 1− d).
Hence it satisfies pointwise bounds. However, its slope is lower in some regions than the slope of the
curve P(Y ≤ y,D = d), so that it fails to satisfy the functional bounds.
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Turning to the joint distribution function of potential outcomes, pointwise bounds can also be
derived very easily. Indeed, we immediately have
P(Y0 ≤ y0, Y1 ≤ y1) ≥ P(Y ≤ min(y0, y1)) and
P(Y0 ≤ y0, Y1 ≤ y1) = P(Y0 ≤ y0, Y1 ≤ y1, Y0 ≤ Y1) + P(Y0 ≤ y0, Y1 ≤ y1, Y0 ≥ Y1)
≤ P(Y ≤ y1, D = 1) + P(Y ≤ y0, D = 0).
(3.1)
Notice that whenever y1 = y0 = y, the lower bound is equal to the upper bound, so that P(Y0 ≤
y, Y1 ≤ y) = P(Y ≤ y) is identified. In the binary Roy model, this corresponds to the case, where
P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) = P(Y = 0). Using this observation, we can derive P(Y1 ≤ y|Y0 ≤ y) = P(Y ≤
y)/P(Y0 ≤ y), hence P(Y1 > y|Y0 ≤ y) = (P(Y0 ≤ y)−P(Y ≤ y))/P(Y0 ≤ y). Since P(Y1 > y|Y0 ≤ y)
is increasing in P(Y0 ≤ y) and P(Y ≤ y,D = d) +P(D = 1− d) is an upper bound for P(Y0 ≤ y), we
can derive the following bounds on the conditional distribution:
P(Y1 > y|Y0 ≤ y) ≤
P(Y > y,D = 1)
P(Y ≤ y,D = d) + P(D = 1− d)
.
As discussed in ?, the counterfactual probability of receiving a higher wage in the other sector is
an important parameter, when measuring wage mobility. It tells us the origin and destination of
individuals who move along the wage distribution under a policy change.
Corollary 1 of Bedford and Meilijson (1997) shows that the bounds (3.1) can be attained under
their competing risks specification. However, once again, these bounds fail to incorporate monotonic-
ity conditions, as we explain in Appendix A.5. They can entail loss of information, when describing
features of Y1 − Y0, of (Y1 − Y0)/Y0, of joint hazard rates, or of the distribution of Y1 conditional
on Y0.
The object of interest is the joint distribution (Y0, Y1), the information on which we wish to
characterize using the identified joint distribution of observable variables (Y,D). Take any subset A
of R2. Bounding the probability of (Y0, Y1) ∈ A above involves bounding P((Y0, Y1) ∈ A, Y0 ≤ Y1)
and P((Y0, Y1) ∈ A, Y1 ≤ Y0). Both terms can be treated symmetrically. Consider P((Y0, Y1) ∈
A, Y0 ≤ Y1) for instance. Take any point (y0, y1) in A such that y0 ≤ y1. It is observationally
equivalent to any point on the half line (−∞, y1) × {y1}, since all that is observed is that Y1 = y1
and Y0 ≤ Y1. Hence, (Y0, Y1) = (y0, y1) could give rise to the observation of Y1 = y1 and the upper
bound is given by the probability that Y falls in the projection of A as defined below and illustrated
in Figure 4 in Appendix A.6.
Definition. For any Borel set A in R2, define the upper sets UA,1 and UA,0 by
UA,1 = {y ∈ R | (−∞, y]× {y} ∩ A 6= ∅} and
UA,0 = {y ∈ R | {y} × (−∞, y] ∩ A 6= ∅}.
We shall formally show that the upper bound is given by P(Y ∈ UA,0, D = 0)+ P(Y ∈ UA,1, D =
1). Similarly, to derive the lower bound, notice that (Y,D) = (y, 1) arises for any (Y0, Y1) ∈
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(−∞, y]×{y}, so that (Y0, Y1) mass could be concentrated outside A unless the whole of (−∞, y]×{y}
is contained in A.
Definition. For any Borel set A in R2, define the lower sets LA,0 and LA,1 by
LA,1 = {y ∈ R | (−∞, y]× {y} ⊆ A} and
LA,0 = {y ∈ R | {y} × (−∞, y] ⊆ A}.
The lower bound will be shown, therefore, to be equal to P(Y ∈ LA,0, D = 0)+P(Y ∈ LA,1, D = 1).
Theorem 3 (Sharp bounds for the joint distribution). Let the distribution of observable variables
(Y,D) on R× {0, 1} be given. The distribution of potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) on R
2 satisfies
P((Y0, Y1) ∈ A) ≥ P(Y ∈ LA,0, D = 0) + P(Y ∈ LA,1, D = 1)
P((Y0, Y1) ∈ A) ≤ P(Y ∈ UA,0, D = 0) + P(Y ∈ UA,1, D = 1)
for all Borel subset A of R2 if and only if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Theorem 3 allows us to easily recover Peterson bounds with suitable choices of A. Choosing
A = (−∞, y]×R yields Peterson bounds on the marginal distribution of Y0. ChoosingA = (−∞, y0]×
(−∞, y1] yields Peterson bounds on the joint distribution of (Y0, Y1). Finally, applying Theorem 3 to
sets of the form (y1, y2]×R and R×(y1, y2] yields the following bounds on the marginal distributions
of Yd, for d = 1, 0:
P(y1 < Y ≤ y2, D = d) + P(Y ≤ y2, D = 1− d)1{y1 = −∞} (3.2)
≤ P(y1 < Yd ≤ y2)
≤ P(y1 < Y ≤ y2, D = d) + P(y1 < Y,D = 1− d). (3.3)
The upper bound (3.3) is redundant. Indeed, it can be recovered from lower bounds on P(y2 <
Yd ≤ ∞) and P(−∞ < Yd ≤ y1). We shall show that the class of sets of the form (y1, y2] × R and
R× (y1, y2] suffice to characterize the marginal potential distributions and that the lower bounds are
functionally sharp, as formulated in Theorem 4 below. The bounds are similar, though not identical,
to the bounds in Theorem 1 of Bedford and Meilijson (1997) for a related competing risks model,
discussed in the paragraph below Assumption 2. The result is proved in the appendix, with a more
rigorous statement and formal definition of functional sharp bounds.
Theorem 4 (Sharp bounds for the marginal distributions). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the bounds
P(y1 < Yd ≤ y2) ≥ P(y1 < Y ≤ y2, D = d) + P(Y ≤ y2, D = 1− d)1{y1 = −∞}
for all y1, y2 ∈ R ∪ {±∞}, y1 < y2, and d = 0, 1, are functional sharp bounds.
Theorem 4 tells us that intervals are sufficient to characterize all the information we have on the
marginal distribution of potential outcomes (Y1, Y0). They form a core determining class of sets,
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in the terminology of Galichon and Henry (2006, 2011). This has several advantages. It allows
the incorporation of an exclusion restriction, as the bound on P (y1 < Yd ≤ y2 | X = x,Xd =
xd) holds for almost all X1−d, which can considerably sharpen the bounds. It lends itself to the
partial identified inference of Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013) and Andrews and Shi (2014).
Identification of the distribution of Yd obtains from (3.2), when X1−d attains values such that D = d
almost surely. The characterization of Theorem 4 allows us to derive sharp bounds on functional
features such as inequality measures and on parameters of semiparametric Roy models.
Functional features of potential distributions. The original motivation of the Roy model was to ana-
lyze the effect of self-selection on wage distributions, and particularly on wage inequality. Heckman
and Honore´ (1990) show that self-selection reduces aggregate inequality when skills are log normal
and within sector inequality when skills have a log concave distribution. One of the purposes of
functional sharp bounds derived in the previous section is to analyze the effect of self-selection on
inequality of potential outcomes in the specification of the Roy model we consider here, where the
Roy model structure is stripped down to the self-selection mechanism. Functional sharp bounds on
the potential outcome distributions allow us to derive sharp bounds on inequality measures. In this
section, we concentrate on the interquantile range, although the same reasoning applies to other
functionals from the vast literature on distributional inequality.
Consider two quantiles q1 and q2 with q2 > q1, as illustrated on Figure 1. The most commonly used
range is the interquartile range, where q1 = 1− q2 = 1/4, but other cases, such as q1 = 1− q2 = 0.1,
are also of great empirical relevance. Peterson bounds on the distribution of Yd impose P(Yd ≤ y1) ≤
P(Y ≤ y1, D = d) + P(D = 1− d) = q1 and P(Yd ≤ y2) ≥ P(Y ≤ y2) = q2. Hence, the upper bound
on the interquantile range based on pointwise sharp bounds for the distribution of Yd is y2 − y1.
However, functional sharp bounds of Theorem 4 are violated, since q2−q1 < P(y1 < Y ≤ y2, D = d).
On Figure 4, we exhibit another pair of points, namely (y˜1, q1) and (y˜2, q2) such that a distribution
for potential Yd cannot cross these two points and satisfy the functional sharp bounds of Theorem 4.
Figure 1. Sharp bounds on the interquantile range for the distribution of Yd. The
pointwise upper bound for the range between quantiles q1 and q2 is y2 − y1. However,
range y˜2 − y˜1 violates functional sharp bounds because q2 − q1 < q˜2 − q˜1.
We now show how to derive sharp bounds for the interquantile range. For ease of notation
throughout this section, we introduce some additional notation.
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Definition. For d = 0, 1, and for each y ∈ R, denote
F (y) := P(Y ≤ y),
Fd(y) := P(Yd ≤ y),
F d(y) := P(Y ≤ y,D = d)
F d(y) := P(Y ≤ y,D = d) + P(D = 1− d),
and f−1 denotes the generalized inverse of f , i.e., f−1(q) = inf{y : f(y) > q}.
Start from any y within the pointwise quantile bounds F
−1
d (q1) ≤ y ≤ F
−1(q2). From y, the
largest interquantile range obtains in either of the following two cases:
(1) when F (y) is hit first, in which case the interquantile range is F−1(q2)− y,
(2) when the potential distribution Fd follows the slope of F d starting from the point with
coordinates (y, q1), in which case the interquantile range is y˜ − y, where y˜ achieves
sup{y˜ : q2 ≥ q1 + F d(y˜)− F d(y)}.
Hence, the interquantile range starting from quantile y is:
IQR(y) = min
(
F−1(q2)− y, F
−1
d (q2 − q1 + F d(y))− y
)
.
Finally, maximizing IQR(y) over admissible y’s yields the upper bound on the interquantile range.
Hence, under Assumptions 1 and 2, the sharp bounds on the interquantile (q1, q2) range are given by:
max(0, F
−1
d (q2)− F
−1(q1))
≤ IQR(q1, q2)
≤ max
F
−1
d
(q1)≤y≤F−1(q1)
(
min
(
F−1(q2)− y, F
−1
d (q2 − q1 + F d(y))− y
))
. (3.4)
From the viewpoint of the interquantile range, we can now consider the effect of self-selection
into the sector of activity (or treatment) on inequality, both within sector and in the aggregate. We
compare outcome distributions resulting from self-selection, hereafter called outcome distributions in
the self-selection economy, to distributions of outcomes that would result from random assignment
of individuals to sectors of activity, hereafter called outcome distributions in the random assignment
economy, as in Heckman and Sedlacek (1985),(1990) and Heckman and Honore´ (1990). In Sector
d, the distribution of outcomes in the random assignment economy is the distribution of potential
outcome Yd, while the distribution of outcomes of the self-selection economy is P(Y ≤ y|D = d).
In the aggregate population, the distribution of outcomes of the random assignment economy is
P(Y0 ≤ y)P(D = 0) + P(Y1 ≤ y)P(D = 1), whereas the distribution of outcomes of the self-selection
economy is simply the distribution of observable outcomes Y . These cases are collected in Table 1.
In Sector d, the interquantile range between quantiles q1 and q2 of the distribution of outcomes
in the random assignment economy is bounded above by (3.4). In the self-selection economy, it is
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Table 1. Distribution of outcomes under self-selection and random assignment.
self-selection economy random economy
Sector d P(Y ≤ y|D = d) P(Yd ≤ y)
Aggregate P(Y ≤ y) P(Y0 ≤ y)P(D = 0) + P(Y1 ≤ y)P(D = 1)
identified as the intequantile range of the distribution P(Y ≤ y|D = d). The following proposition
show how they compare.
Proposition 1 (Inequality in Sector d).
(1) If the distribution of outcomes Y conditional on D = d first order stochastically dominates
the distribution of outcomes Y conditional on D = 1 − d, i.e., P(Y ≤ y|D = d) ≤ P(Y ≤
y|D = 1 − d) for all y ∈ R, then, for any pair of quantiles, the interquantile range of the
distribution of outcomes in Sector d in the self-selected economy is lower than the upper
bound of the interquantile range of the distribution of outcomes in Sector d in the random
assignment economy.
(2) If the stochastic dominance relation of (1) does not hold, then there exists pairs (Y,D) such
that the interquantile range of the distribution of outcomes in Sector d in the self-selected
economy is larger than the upper bound of the interquantile range of the distribution of
outcomes in Sector d in the random assignment economy.
Proposition 1 tells us two things. On the one hand, if Sector d is unambiguously more profitable
in the self-selected economy, it is possible for inequality in Sector d, as measured by the interquantile
range, to decrease with self-selection, relative to an economy with random assignment of individuals
to sectors. On the other hand, if neither sector dominates the other in the self-selection economy, then
there are joint distributions of observables under which we know that self-selection unambiguously
increases inequality in Sector d. In case no sector stochastically dominates the other, the hypothesis
that self-selection increases inequality is testable based on the bounds of (3.4), in the sense that one
can test the hypothesis that the interquantile range in the self-selected economy is larger than the
upper bound of the interquantile range in the randomized economy.
4. Roy model of college major choice in Canada
Since James, Alsalam, Conaty, and To (1989) pointed out that major choice mattered more to
labour market outcomes than college choice, the literature on returns to college education has placed
some focus on the determinants of major choice and the effects on labour market outcomes. The
salient classification that has come to dominate the debate is between STEM (Science, Technology,
Engineering and Mathematics) and non-STEM degrees, and there is ample evidence of the labour
market advantages conferred on male graduates by STEM degrees: James, Alsalam, Conaty, and To
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(1989) and Arcidiacono (2004) for the US, Kelly, O’Connell, and Smyth (2010) for Ireland, Chevalier
(2011) for the UK, Maselli and Beblavy` (2014) for several EU countries.
The wage benefits of STEM degrees have been found to be a significant but not sole determinant
of major choice. Arcidiacono (2004) finds that high ability students view education as a consump-
tion good in the US. Beffy, Fouge`re, and Maurel (2012) find elasticity of major choice to expected
income to be significant, but less important as a determinant of major choice in France than hetero-
geneity in preferences for the subject matter. We revisit the issue using our nonparametrics bounds
methodology on Canadian data. We examine whether STEM labour market advantage is robust,
and whether the data is consistent with a Roy selection of students into the two sectors based on
anticipated labour market outcomes only. We study how the answers depend on socio-economic
background, minority status, age and labour market experience before enrollment. One hypoth-
esis of interest is that students who take on student loans are more likely to self-select based on
anticipated labour market outcomes, than students with no financial constraints.
The picture is rather different for women. The labour market advantages, if present, are not so
clear-cut, as noted by Zafar (2013) and Hunt, Garant, Herman, and Munroe (2013), and women
are severely under-represented in STEM education and even more so in STEM jobs. The evidence,
summarized in Beede, Julian, Langdon, McKittrick, Khan, and Doms (2011), was sufficiently over-
whelming for President Obama to declare, in 2013,
One of the things that I really strongly believe in is that we need to have more girls
interested in math, science, and engineering. We’ve got half the population that
is way under-represented in those fields and that means that we’ve got a whole
bunch of talent that is not being encouraged the way they need to.
Two dominant explanations for the under-representation of women in STEM education and in
STEM careers are discrimination, which lowers expected wages for women in STEM, and gender
profiling, which keeps young women away from STEM education. The former is compatible with a
Roy model of career choice, assuming wage discrimination is anticipated, and can be addressed by
policies fighting lower labour market outcomes for women in STEM, such as the pay equity laws in
most Canadian provinces (all except British Columbia, Newfoundland and Sakatchewan), the 2013
US Cross Agency Priority, offering training programs for female STEM undergraduates and the C-3E
(Clean Energy, Education and Empowerment) Awards to mid-career women in STEM. The latter
involves non pecuniary considerations in major choice, therefore requires generalized Roy modeling
and can be addressed by policies aimed at encouraging young women into STEM education, such
as the US “Invest in Innovation Fund,” offering grants to schools that support girls in STEM and
financial support to young women who enroll in STEM degrees. The Canadian non profit hEr
VOLUTION targets both channels by providing education and employment services for women in
STEM, from low income households and underprivileged communities. Given the divergence in
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policy implications of these two channels, it is important to investigate which of the two is the
dominant effect. A similar pattern should also be investigated for minority students and students
from low income households.
The under-representation of women in STEM jobs is often cited as a major contributer to the
gender wage gap, as in Daymont and Andrisani (1984). More generally, there is a large amount
of informal discussion, although, to the best of our knowledge, little formal investigation, of the
contribution of the STEM economy to rising wage inequality; see, for instance, Brynjolfsson and
McAfee (2012), who attribute rising inequality to skill-based technological change. Our methodology
allows us to address this issue by comparing inequality in STEM wages to inequality in non-STEM
wages in a counterfactual economy, where sector allocation is random. We can also investigate the
effect of self-selection on sectoral and aggregate wage inequality.
Data. The empirical analysis of the binary Roy model relies on Statistics Canada’s follow up of the
National Graduates Survey (NGS). Every five years, Statistics Canada collect detailed information
on a representative sample of recent college and university graduates. Our analysis makes use of the
2010 NGS, the most recent NGS currently available. The graduates were followed up in 2013, at
which time an extensive interview collected information about labor market activities, educational
background, and other socio-economic variables. An important shortcoming of the public use file
of the NGS is that the wage variable is reported in $5,000 interval ranges. For the analysis of the
continuous Roy model, where the outcome of interest is the wage, we rely on the Canadian 1996
and 2011 censuses which provide more precise wage estimates ($1,000 precision).
In the public use version of the NGS, the field of study is reported at a ten-category aggregation
level. We further merge the fields of study into two categories. The STEM-degree category consists
of Physical and life sciences, Mathematics and Computer Science, and Engineering and related
fields. The remaining majors are merged in the non-STEM-degree category. For our analysis, we
only consider Canadian citizens, who are active on the labor market (that is, we exclude students
at the time of the follow-up survey) with at least a Bachelor degree at the time of the graduation
(2009-2010). This leaves us with 7,037 usable observations. Table 2 displays a number of descriptive
statistics from the NGS. While women are over-represented in the graduate population, a striking
gender difference exists in the choice of major. One out of 3 men studied in a STEM degree, whereas
only one out of 7 women enrolled in this type of major. Women’s major choice is relatively constant
across province. Ontario and Quebec shows the highest concentration of STEM degrees among
men (above 42%) and women (above 17%). Among men and women with a non-STEM degree,
around 40% of graduates hold a Masters or PhD degree, irrespective of the aggregate field of study.
However, female STEM graduates seem to study longer on average. Around 50% of them hold at
least a Masters or PHD degree. Graduates with a STEM degree, men and women, graduate at a
younger age than their non-STEM counterparts and are less likely to have worked prior to their
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enrollment. Finally, female STEM graduates seem to have better educated parents on average, than
their STEM counterparts.
The NGS asks detailed information about characteristics of the job held during the week prior to
the survey (if applicable). Importantly for our analysis, the survey records whether the current job
is permanent or temporary. A second observed characteristic of the job used here is the assessment
of the graduate of how related the job is to his/her educational qualification. One reason why one’s
job might not be related to the education is that it does not use the specific skills acquired in an
educational program. In both dimensions and for both genders, male STEM graduates seem to hold
a premium over male non-STEM graduates as they are at least 2.5% more likely to have a permanent
job and 8% more likely to have a job related to their educational qualification.
The empirical analysis of the continuous Roy model is based on the public use file of the 1996
and 2011 censuses in Canada. Both databases record information on the field of study. The 2011
census uses the same Classification of Instructional Program (CIP) as the NGS, while the 1996 as
a somewhat different classification. For the 1996 census, the following categories are considered
as STEM degrees: Engineering and applied sciences, building technologies, data processing and
computer science technologies, electronic and electrical technologies, other engineering and applied
science technologies and trades, and mathematics and physical sciences. The classification of ed-
ucational attainment also differs between each census and the NGS. In the following analysis, the
category “Master and PhD” consists of all individuals with a university degree higher than the
Bachelor degree level. Neither of the censuses allows to construct a reliable measure of hourly wages
because detailed information on annual hours of work is not available. Following Lemieux (2015),
we use annual wages for full-time workers as the principal measure of wages. All wages are expressed
in 2010 CAD. Wage deflators are computed from the World Bank GDP deflator. We exclude from
the sample individuals with a degree lower than a bachelor degree, self-employed individuals and
immigrants, whose education is often not comparable to the education of Canadian-born workers.
The sample consists of individuals aged below 65 at the time of the census. We can control for age
(5-year age groups) as a proxy for experience, province of origin, as well as for the ethnicity (being
a visible minority or not).
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics on the wage distribution of STEM and non-STEM degrees,
by gender. As in the NGS, STEM degrees are more popular among men than among women.
Nevertheless, STEM degrees have become slitghtly more attractive in the more recent cohort. There
is clear first order stochastic dominance of STEM wages over the non-STEM wages, an advantage of
about $10,000 for men, over all the quartiles in the two years considered. The advantage for women
is more modest, about between $2,000 to $4,000 in the median or upper end on the distribution.
In the lower end of the distribution, wages in the non-STEM category have been increasing faster
than those in the STEM category. Therefore, inequality (as measured by the IQR) seems to have
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increased more among women STEM than among women non-STEM. Overall, inequality seems to
have increased within all gender-degree category.
Empirical methodology. From the NGS sample, we first construct four sub-samples based on
gender and the degree type (Bachelor or Masters/PhD). We include the following covariates.
(1) Region (Western provinces, Ontario, Que´bec, Atlantic provinces).
(2) Age at graduation (above or below 30 years of age).
(3) Size of the governmental student loan (0, (0,$5000), [$5000,$10000), [$10000,$25,000) and
above $25000).
(4) Work experience before enrollment.
(5) Visible minority status.
The father’s education level is used as an instrument Z, i.e., a variable that affects sector selection
but not outcomes conditional on the sector. Figure 5 shows variation in the instrument for women
with a Masters or a PhD. Sector choice is clearly non monotone in the instrument, which is no
concern for our methodology, but invalidates traditional procedures, such as the Heckman sample
selection correction in Willis and Rosen (1979). In the 1996 and 2011 census, we construct 8 sub-
samples based on gender, degree and region. We additionally control for age at the time of the
census (in five year groups) and visible minority status. We conduct inference based on the bounds
of Corollary 4, of A.4.1, A.4.4, (3.2) and (3.4) with the STATA package clrbounds implementing
Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013). Details of the procedure are given in Appendix B.
Results. Our results broadly confirm the advantages conferred on male graduates by STEM degrees.
Calling confidence interval I1 = [l1, u1] greater than confidence interval I2 = [l2, u2] when u1 ≥ u2
and l1 ≥ l2, we observe that confidence intervals for the probability of obtaining a permanent job
with a STEM degree are consistently greater than the corresponding intervals for non-STEM degrees,
as illustrated in the left-hand panel of Figure 6 and Figure 9. The advantage to STEM degree is
significatively positive for the probability of securing a permanent job in Quebec and Ontario, as
seen on the left-hand panel of Figure 6. The increase is at least of 8 percentage points for Masters
and PhD students in Ontario. The same pattern is present for students from visible minorities, as
illustrated in Figure 8. Only in the case of graduates free of government debt and who obtained a
Masters or PhD, is this advantage reversed, when we consider the probability of finding a permanent
job (see Figure ).
Bounds on the average benefit of the chosen sector, i.e., E(Y1−Y0|D = 1) and E(Y0−Y1|D = 0) are
consistent with labour market outcomes being a dominant factor in the choice of major, particularly
for men choosing STEM. As illustrated in the lower left-hand panel of Figure 10, the lower bounds
on E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1) are positive, so that we reject the hypothesis that young men with significant
student debt, who obtained a STEMMasters or PhD would have had a better chance of a permanent
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job with a non-STEM degree. This is no longer true for students free of government debt, as seen on
the left-hand panel of Figure 11, confirming the intuition that the labour market outcome motivation
may be more important for financially constrained students.
On the other hand, in Figures 10 and 13, the lower bounds for E(Y0 − Y1|D = 0) are negative, so
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that graduates chose non-STEM degrees for reasons unrelated
to labour market outcomes, such as the consumption value of the chosen major.
Figure 8 and Figure 12 indicate a greater emphasis put on labour market outcomes in minority
students’ choice of major. The labour market advantage of STEM is more pronounced for men from
visible minorities and chosen sector advantage is almost always significantly positive.
More insight into the motivations for major choice is provided by the examination of testable
implications of the the Roy model mechanism, which imposes labour market outcomes as the sole
determinent of major choice. Letting Z denote the instrument, i.e., parental education, as before,
the Roy mechanism implies both
P(Y1 > Y0) ≤ P(D = 1|Z = z) ≤ P(Y1 ≥ Y0) (4.1)
for all values z of the instrument, and Y independent of Z, conditionally on other covariates. Inde-
pendence of Y and Z is never rejected except in the case of men with a Bachelor’s degree from a
Western province. As illustrated in the left-hand panels of Figures 14 and 15, there are no violations
of (4.1) either.
As anticipated from the previous literature on major choice, the picture looks very different for
women. Our findings tally with Zafar (2013) in that no clear labour market advantage of STEM
over non-STEM degrees emerges for women, as it does for men. The contrast between men and
women is particular stark as concerns the probability of securing a job related to the field of study,
as seen in Figure 9. This is consistent with prior evidence that women who graduate in STEM are
less likely than men to secure a STEM job.
A notable feature of our results on women’s major choice and labour market outcomes, illustrated
on the right-hand panel of Figure 6 and even more so Figure 9, is the tightness of the confidence
intervals for potential outcomes in case of non-STEM degrees. This is due to the significant variation
in major choice induced by the instrument, as shown in Figure 5, and the fact that women whose
parents hold intermediate level degrees are very unlikely to choose STEM. In turn, the low numbers
of women in STEM induces more sampling variability and hence larger intervals for probabilities of
a permanent job or a job related to field of study under STEM.
On the right-hand panels of Figures 10 and 13, we see that the benefit of choosing STEM for
the women who studied STEM is positive, which is inconsistent with unanticipated gender discrim-
ination, i.e., with women choosing STEM on the basis of the price of their STEM specific talent,
but consistent with anticipated discrimination, and women choosing on the basis of effective labour
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market outcomes. Figures 10 and 13 show the possibility of women choosing non-STEM studies on
the basis of other considerations than labour market outcomes, but not obviously more so than men.
A stark difference between genders, however, emerges in the top panels of Figures 14 and 15.
For women, the hypothesis that P(D = 1) ≥ P(Y1 > Y0), which implies a Roy model selection rule,
based solely on market outcome, is rejected for Bachelor degrees in Atlantic and Western provinces,
as the lower bound of the confidence interval for P(Y1 > Y0) is larger than the upper bound of
the confidence interval for P(D = 1). Otherwise, the hypothesis that P(D = 1) = P(Y1 > Y0),
which implies that women choose STEM when Y1 > Y0 and non-STEM in all other cases, cannot
be rejected. In other words, if the labour market outcomes are the same, they prefer non-STEM
degrees. Note that the confidence intervals for P(D = 1) are tighter, since it is an identified quantity.
When considering a narrower definition of STEM, which excludes physical and life sciences, the Roy
model selection rule, based solely on market outcome, is rejected in every province, as shown on the
right-hand panel of figure 16.
Absent an instrument, the continuous Roy model for wages delivers functional bounds that are
wide, but do provide some insights into the effect of self-selection on wage distributions. The left
panel of Figure 17 shows bounds on the probabilities of observed and potential annual wages falling
into one of the following four tranches, 0− $40000, $40000− $58000, $58000− $76000 and beyond4,
in 1996, whereas the right-hand panel shows the same in 2011. There is no noticeable change from
the earlier period to the later period. The bounds produce an accurate picture of the distribution
of potential wages in the non-STEM sector. They also reveal some startlingly sharp differences
between the two sectors and between observed and potential distributions. The proportion of high
wage individuals is unequivocally higher in the observed distribution for STEM graduates, than in the
potential one. The proportion of low wages is correspondingly lower in the observed distributions, so
that self-selection benefits female STEM graduates. There is also some, albeit weaker, evidence that
self-selection increases the proportion of high wage non-STEM graduates. The effect on inequality,
as measured by the interquartile range, is ambiguous. We see from Figure 18, that bounds on the
interquartile range of the wage distributions of Ontario female graduates do not allow any meaningful
comparison between potential and observed outcomes. There is weak evidence that self-selection
decreases inequality in wages of female non-STEM graduates in the Atlantic and Western provinces
only.
5. Discussion
We have proposed a characterization of the empirical content of the Roy model in the form of
sharp bounds on the joint distribution of potential outcomes. A special emphasis was placed on
the case, where outcomes are binary, which we interpreted as a success-failure or a latent variables
4These tranches were chosen to fit the quartiles of the overall wage distribution in the 2011 census.
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model. Sharp bounds were derived for the joint distribution of potential outcomes under exclusion
restrictions. In the case of continuous outcomes, we distinguished pointwise and functionally sharp
bounds and showed the importance of the latter, when deriving bounds on functional features,
such as measures of potential outcome inequality within each sector and across sectors. Extending
our results to allow exclusion restrictions in the continuous outcome case would require a different
methodology than that employed in the binary case, which relies on the representation of the joint
distribution of potential outcomes on a finite dimensional simplex. The methodology was applied to
a Roy model of STEM versus non-STEM major choice in Canadian universities, in order to tackle
the issue of under-representation of women in STEM education. Our results show evidence of a
labour market advantage of STEM for male graduates, but not for female graduates. The results
are consistent with a choice of STEM studies motivated by labour market outcomes, but there is
evidence of other considerations motivating the choice of non-STEM studies for many categories of
students. Financially constrained and minority students, however, seem to conform more closely to
the simple Roy model of self-selection on labour market outcomes. Finally, there is evidence, albeit
weak, of more inequality in the potential than the observed wage distribution of female non-STEM
graduates, consistent with inequality decreasing through self-sorting. Since women are severely
under-represented in engineering, but over-represented in life sciences, the current aggregation into
STEM and non-STEM categories hides an important aspect of the issue. An extension of our
methodology to more disaggregated choices would be desirable. However, we anticipate the need for
data on individual rankings of non prefered options for any hope of informative identified regions.
Appendix A. Proofs of results in the main text
A.1. Theorem 1.
A.1.1. Statement of Theorem 1. Fix the pair of binary random variables (Y,D) with probability mass func-
tion (q00 = P(Y = 0, D = 0), q01 = P(Y = 0, D = 1), q10 = P(Y = 1, D = 0), q11 = P(Y = 1, D = 1)). The
following two statements hold. (1) If the vector (p00, p01, p10) ∈ R
3 satisfies 0 ≤ p10 ≤ q10, 0 ≤ p01 ≤ q11 and
p00 = q00+q01, then there exists a pair of binary random variables (Y0, Y1) such that Assumptions 1 and 2 are
satisfied and P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0) = p00, P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) = p01 and P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) = p10. (2) Conversely,
if the pair of binary random variables (Y0, Y1) satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, then P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) ≤ q10,
P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) ≤ q11 and P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0) = q00 + q01.
A.1.2. Proof of Theorem 1. Write qij := P(Y = i,D = j) and pij := P(Y0 = i, Y1 = j) for each i, j =
0, 1. The binary Roy model of Definition 1 can be equivalently defined as a correspondence G between
values of observables (y, d) ∈ A := {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} and values of unobservables (y0, y1) ∈ A.
The correspondence is defined by its values G(y, d) for each (y, d) ∈ A, namely G(1, 1) := {(1, 1), (0, 1)},
G(1, 0) := {(1, 1), (1, 0)}, G(0, 1) := {(0, 0)} and G(0, 0) := {(0, 0)}. By Theorem 1 of Galichon and Henry
(2011), the 14 inequalities P((Y0, Y1) ∈ A) ≤ P(G(Y,D) ∩ A 6= ∅) for each A ⊂ A provide a collection of
sharp bounds for the model defined by the correspondence G. For instance, A = {(0, 0)} yields the inequality
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p00 ≤ q00 + q01 and A = {(1, 1), (0, 1)} yields the inequality p11 + p01 ≤ q11 + q10. To prove the result, it
suffices to show that all 14 inequalities are implied by 0 ≤ p10 ≤ q10, 0 ≤ p01 ≤ q11 and p00 = q00 + q01. The
14 inequalities are listed below. Singleton A’s yield
p11 ≤ q11 + q10
p10 ≤ q10
p01 ≤ q11
p00 ≤ q01 + q00.
(A.1)
Pairs yield
p11 + p10 ≤ q11 + q10
p11 + p01 ≤ q11 + q10
p11 + p00 ≤ 1
p10 + p01 ≤ q11 + q10
p10 + p00 ≤ q10 + q01 + q00
p01 + p00 ≤ q11 + q01 + q00.
(A.2)
Finally, triplets yield
p11 + p10 + p01 ≤ q11 + q10
p11 + p10 + p00 ≤ 1
p11 + p01 + p00 ≤ 1
p10 + p01 + p00 ≤ 1.
(A.3)
The first four inequalities in (A.2) are implied by the first inequality in (A.3). The last two are implied by
(A.1). All inequalities in (A.2) are therefore redundant. Since p11 = 1−p00−p01−p10, all four inequalities in
(A.1) are implied by 0 ≤ p10 ≤ q10, 0 ≤ p01 ≤ q11 and p00 = q00+q01. Finally, since p11+p10+p01 = 1−p00,
the first inequality in (A.3) is implied by p00 = q00 + q01 and the result follows.
A.1.3. Extension to the alternative binary Roy model. (1) First, we show that P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) ≤ q10,
P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) ≤ q11 and P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0) = q00 + q01 hold if (Y,D, Y0, Y1) satisfy the assumptions
of Definition 2. Under the specification of Definition 2, Y0 = 1 and Y1 = 0 jointly imply that Y
∗
0 > Y
∗
1 ,
which in turn implies D = 0 and Y = 1, so that the first inequality holds. The second holds by the same
reasoning and the roles of Y0 and Y1 reversed. Finally, Y0 = Y1 = 0 implies Y = 0, and Y = 1 implies
that Y0 = 1 or Y1 = 1, so the equality holds as well. (2) Second, the binary Roy model specification of
Definition 1 is nested in the alternative binary Roy model specification of Definition 2. Indeed, the former
can be obtained by restricting (Y ∗0 , Y
∗
1 ) to be binary. Hence, sharpness of the bounds for the binary Roy
model implies sharpness for the alternative binary Roy model. The result follows.
A.1.4. Representation of the bounds on the 2-simplex. We continue to denote P(Y = i, D = j) = qij and
P(Y0 = i, Y1 = j) = pij . According to Theorem 1, p00 = q01 + q00. Hence, the remaining three probabilities,
namely p10, p01 and p11 = q11 + q10− p10− p01 can be represented in barycentric coordinates in the rescaled
2-simplex of Figure 2, where the three vertices correspond to the cases, where p11 = q11+q10, p10 = q11+q10
and p01 = q11 + q10 respectively.
A.1.5. Proof of Corollary 1. The proof of Theorem 1 hold conditionally on Z and the result follows, since,
by joint independence of (Y0, Y1) with Z, we have P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0|Z) = P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) and P(Y0 =
0, Y1 = 1|Z) = P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1).
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Figure 2. Identified set for (p10, p01, p11 = q11 + q10 − p10 − p01) in barycentric coordi-
nates in the rescaled 2-simplex. p00 is identified and equal to q01 + q00. The left-hand-side
figure is without excluded variable Z. The right-hand-side is in the presence of variation
in an excluded variable Z.
A.1.6. Proof of Corollary 2. First note that P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z) + P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z) = P(Y = 1|Z) =
P(Y = 1) since Y and Z are independent. Hence, q
11
+ q¯10 = q¯11 + q10 = P(Y = 1). Since p00 = P(Y =
0) is identified, consider the identified set for (p10, p01, p11) characterized by p10 ≤ q10, p01 ≤ q11 and
p11 = q11 + q10 − p01 − p10. This is a two-parameter characterization of the identified set, illustrated in
Figure 2. Since α1 := p11 + p01 = q11 + q10 − p01 − p10 + p01 = q¯11 + q10 − p10 and α0 := p11 + p10 =
q11+q10−p01−p10+p10 = q¯11+q10−p01, this can be equivalently reparameterized as q¯11 ≤ α1 ≤ P(Y = 1),
q¯10 ≤ α0 ≤ P(Y = 1) and p11 = q11 + q10 − p01 − p10. Hence the identified set for (EY0,EY1) = (α0, α1) is
characterized by q¯10 ≤ EY0 ≤ P(Y = 1) and q¯11 ≤ EY1 ≤ P(Y = 1), which completes the proof.
A.1.7. Proof of Corollary 3. Validity of the bounds was proved in the main text. For sharpness, fix (x0, x1) in
the Support of (X0, X1). For a given random vector (Y,D) of binary random variables, denote by qij(x˜0, x˜1)
the conditional probability P(Y = i,D = j|X0 = x˜0, X1 = x˜1) for any (x˜0, x˜1) in the Support of (X0, X1).
Consider any pair (a(x0), b(x1)) satisfying
q10(x0, x˜1) ≤ a(x0) ≤ q11(x0, x˜1) + q10(x0, x˜1) (A.4)
for almost all x˜1 ∈ Supp(X1|X0 = x0), and
q11(x˜0, x1) ≤ b(x1) ≤ q11(x˜0, x1) + q10(x˜0, x1) (A.5)
for almost all x˜0 ∈ Supp(X0|X1 = x1). We exhibit a pair of binary random variables (Y0, Y1) with joint
distribution pij := P(Y0 = i, Y1 = j|X0 = x0, X1 = x1), such that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied, and
such that
p11(x0, x1) + p10(x0, x1) = a(x0) and p11(x0, x1) + p01(x0, x1) = b(x1). (A.6)
Here is our proposed distribution.
p00(x0, x1) = q00(x0, x1) + q01(x0, x1),
p11(x0, x1) = b(x1) + a(x0)− q10(x0, x1)− q11(x0, x1),
p10(x0, x1) = q10(x0, x1) + q11(x0, x1)− b(x1),
p01(x0, x1) = q10(x0, x1) + q11(x0, x1)− a(x0).
Note that (A.6) is verified by construction. We also verify that p00(x0, x1) + p01(x0, x1) + p10(x0, x1) +
p11(x0, x1) = 1 and that p00, p10, and p01 are nonnegative. From (A.4) and (A.5), q10(x1, x0)+ q11(x1, x0) ≤
a(x0) + b(x1), which implies that p11(x0, x1) is also nonnegative.
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Assumption 3 is implied by (A.6) irrespective of the construction of (Y0, Y1). We now construct a pair
(Y0, Y1) with conditional distribution pij(x0, x1) such that Assumptions 1 and 2 are both satisfied. First con-
struct a random variable U with uniform distribution on [0, 1] in the following way. Set U ∈ [0, q00(x0, x1)+
q01(x0, x1)] if and only if Y = 0. Set U ∈ (q00(x0, x1)+q01(x0, x1), q00(x0, x1)+q01(x0, x1)+q10(x0, x1)] if and
only if (Y,D) = (1, 0). Finally, set U ∈ (q00(x0, x1)+q01(x0, x1)+q10(x0, x1), 1] if and only if (Y,D) = (1, 1).
Now set (Y0, Y1) = (0, 0) if and only if U ≤ q00(x0, x1) + q01(x0, x1), (Y0, Y1) = (1, 0) if and only
if U ∈ (q00(x0, x1) + q01(x0, x1), q00(x0, x1) + q01(x0, x1) + p10(x0, x1)], (Y0, Y1) = (1, 1) if and only if
U ∈ (q00(x0, x1) + q01(x0, x1) + p10(x0, x1), 1 − p01(x0, x1)], and (Y0, Y1) = (0, 1) if and only if U ∈
(1 − p01(x0, x1), 1]. By construction, (Y0, Y1) has probability mass distribution pij(x0, x1) and satisfies
Assumptions 1 and 2. This completes the proof.
A.2. Sharp bounds for conditional distributions Yd|Y1−d.
A.2.1. Additional assumption. The following quantities are well defined.
q0(x0) := inf{P(Y = 1|X0 = x0, X1 = x˜1) : x˜1 ∈ Supp(X1|X0 = x0)},
q1(x1) := inf{P(Y = 1|X0 = x˜0, X1 = x1) : x˜0 ∈ Supp(X0|X1 = x1)},
q¯
0
10(x0) := inf{P(Y = 1, D = 0|X0 = x0, X1 = x˜1) : x˜1 ∈ Supp(X1|X0 = x0)},
q¯
1
11(x1) := inf{P(Y = 1, D = 1|X0 = x˜0, X1 = x1) : x˜0 ∈ Supp(X0|X1 = x1)}.
A.2.2. Statement of Corollary. Under the additional assumption, sharp bounds for the conditional distribu-
tions of potential outcomes are given by
P(Y = 1|X0 = x0, X1 = x1)− q
0(x0)
1− q0(x0)
≤ P(Y1 = 1|Y0 = 0, X0 = x0, X1 = x1)
≤
P(Y = 1|X0 = x0, X1 = x1)− q¯
0
10(x0)
1− q¯0
10
(x0)
,
P(Y = 1|X0 = x0, X1 = x1)− q
1(x1)
1− q1(x1)
≤ P(Y0 = 1|Y1 = 0, X0 = x0, X1 = x1)
≤
P(Y = 1|X0 = x0, X1 = x1)− q¯
1
11(x1)
1− q¯1
11
(x1)
.
A.2.3. Proof of Corollary. Consider the proposed proposed distribution from the proof of Corollary 3.
p00(x0, x1) = q00(x0, x1) + q01(x0, x1),
p11(x0, x1) = b(x1) + a(x0)− q10(x0, x1)− q11(x0, x1),
p10(x0, x1) = q10(x0, x1) + q11(x0, x1)− b(x1),
p01(x0, x1) = q10(x0, x1) + q11(x0, x1)− a(x0).
We showed in the proof of Corollary 3 that pij(x0, x1) is the probability mass function of a pair of binary
random variables (Y0, Y1) that satisfy Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, if and only if a(x0) ∈ [q¯
0
10(x0), q
0(x0)] and
a(x0) ∈ [q¯
1
11(x1), q
1(x1)]. Therefore,
P(Y1 = 1|Y0 = 0, X0 = x0, X1 = x1) =
p01(x0, x1)
1− a(x0)
=
q10(x0, x1) + q11(x0, x1)− a(x0)
1− a(x0)
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is an admissible conditional distribution for any a(x0) ∈ [q¯
0
10(x0), q
0(x0)], and similarly for P(Y0 = 1|Y1 =
0, X0 = x0, X1 = x1). The result follows from setting a(x0) and b(x1) at their extreme values.
A.3. Theorem 2.
A.3.1. Statement of Theorem 2. Fix the pair of binary random variables (Y,D) with conditional probability
mass function (q00(z) = P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = z), q01(z) = P(Y = 0, D = 1|Z = z), q10(z) = P(Y = 1, D =
0|Z = z), q11(z) = P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z)). The following two statements hold. (1) If, for almost all z ∈
Supp(Z), the vector (p00, p01, p10, p11) ∈ R
4 satisfies 0 ≤ p11 ≤ q10(z) + q11(z), 0 ≤ p00 ≤ q00(z) + q01(z),
0 ≤ p10 ≤ q10(z)+ q01(z), 0 ≤ p01 ≤ q00(z)+ q11(z), q10(z) ≤ p10+ p11 ≤ 1− q00(z) and q11(z) ≤ p01+ p11 ≤
1− q01(z), then there exists a pair of binary random variables (Y0, Y1) such that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are
satisfied and P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0|Z = z) = p00, P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1|Z = z) = p01, P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0|Z = z) = p10
and P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 1|Z = z) = p11. (2) Conversely, if the pair of binary random variables (Y0, Y1) satisfies
Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, then P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 1) ≤ q10(z) + q11(z), P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 0) ≤ q00(z) + q01(z),
P(Y0 = 1, Y1 = 0) ≤ q10(z) + q01(z), P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) ≤ q00(z) + q11(z), q10(z) ≤ P(Y0 = 1) ≤ 1 − q00(z)
and q11(z) ≤ P(Y1 = 1) ≤ 1− q01(z).
A.3.2. Proof of Theorem 2. Write qij(z) := P(Y = i, D = j|Z = z) and pij := P(Y0 = i, Y1 = j) for
each i, j = 0, 1. The generalized binary Roy model of Definition 3 can be equivalently defined as a cor-
respondence G between values of observables (y, d) ∈ A := {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} and values of unob-
servables (y0, y1) ∈ A. The correspondence is defined by its values G(y, d) for each (y, d) ∈ A, namely
G(1, 1) := {(1, 1), (0, 1)}, G(1, 0) := {(1, 1), (1, 0)}, G(0, 1) := {(1, 0), (0, 0)} and G(0, 0) := {(0, 1), (0, 0)}.
By Theorem 1 of Galichon and Henry (2011), the 14 inequalities P((Y0, Y1) ∈ A) ≤ P(G(Y,D)∩A 6= ∅|Z = z)
for each A ⊂ A provide a collection of sharp bounds for the model defined by the correspondence G. To prove
the result, it suffices to show that all 14 inequalities are implied by p11 ≤ q10(z)+q11(z), p00 ≤ q00(z)+q01(z),
p10 ≤ q10(z)+q01(z), p01 ≤ q00(z)+q11(z), q10(z) ≤ p10+p11 ≤ 1−q00(z) and q11(z) ≤ p01+p11 ≤ 1−q01(z).
The 14 inequalities are listed below. Singleton A’s yield
p11 ≤ q11(z) + q10(z)
p10 ≤ q10(z) + q01(z)
p01 ≤ q11(z) + q00(z)
p00 ≤ q01(z) + q00(z).
(A.7)
Pairs yield
p11 + p10 ≤ q11(z) + q10(z) + q01(z)
p11 + p01 ≤ q11(z) + q10(z) + q00(z)
p11 + p00 ≤ 1
p10 + p01 ≤ 1
p10 + p00 ≤ q10(z) + q01(z) + q00(z)
p01 + p00 ≤ q11(z) + q01(z) + q00(z).
(A.8)
Finally, triplets yield
p11 + p10 + p01 ≤ 1
p11 + p10 + p00 ≤ 1
p11 + p01 + p00 ≤ 1
p10 + p01 + p00 ≤ 1.
(A.9)
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All four inequalities in (A.7) are included in the statement of the theorem and the non trivial inequalities
in (A.8) are equivalent to q10(z) ≤ p10 + p11 ≤ 1 − q00(z) and q11(z) ≤ p01 + p11 ≤ 1 − q01(z). The result
follows.
A.3.3. Proof of Corollary 4. In addition to q¯10 ≤ EY0 ≤ 1− q¯00, EY0, which is equal to p11+ p10 is bounded
above by the largest c such that the plane p11 + p10 = c hits the intersection in the 3-simplex of the regions
defined by p11 ≤ q1 and p10 ≤ q10−01 respectively. The latter is equal to c = q1 + q10−01. Similarly, EY0 is
bounded below by the smallest c such that the plane p11 + p10 = c hits the intersection in the 3-simplex of
the regions defined p01 ≤ q00−11 and p00 ≤ q0 respectively. The latter is c = 1− q0 − q00−11. This exhausts
all the information in the bounds for the joint distribution and all other values of the sum p11 + p10 can be
attained. The same reasoning holds for EY1 and the result follows.
A.4. Policy relevant bi-products of Theorem 2.
A.4.1. Bounds on the proportion that strictly benefits from Sector 1.
P(Y0 = 0, Y1 = 1) = p01 ∈ [0, q00−11]
= 1− p11 − p10 − p00 ∈ [1− q1 − q10−01 − q0, 1]
= 1− (p11 + p10)− p00 ∈ [q¯00 − q0, 1− q¯10]
= 1− p11 − (p10 + p00) ∈ [q¯11 − q1, 1− q¯01].
Since q
00−11
≤ min(1− q¯01, 1− q¯10), the bounds are
max(0, 1− q
1
− q
10−01
− q
0
, q¯00 − q0, q¯11 − q1) ≤ P(Y1 > Y0) ≤ q00−11.
A.4.2. Bounds on ex-post regret.
P(Y1 = 1|Y0 = 0, D = 0, Z = z) ≤
P(Y1 = 1, Y0 = 0|Z = z)
P(Y0 = 0, D = 0|Z = z)
=
P(Y1 = 1, Y0 = 0)
P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = z)
≤
q
00−11
P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = z)
.
A.4.3. Distributional mobility.
max{0, 1− q
1
− q
10−01
− q
0
, q¯00 − q0, q¯11 − q1)
1−max(q¯10, 1− q0 − q00−11)
≤ P(Y1 = 1|Y0 = 0) ≤
q
00−11
1−min(1− q¯00, q1 + q10−01)
.
A.4.4. Average gains from the selected sector.
E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1, Z = z) = P(Y = 1|D = 1, Z = z)−
P(Y0 = 1, D = 1|Z = z)
P(D = 1|Z = z)
,
=
P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z) + P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z)− P(Y0 = 1|Z = z)
P(D = 1|Z = z)
=
P(Y = 1|Z = z)− P(Y0 = 1)
P(D = 1|Z = z)
.
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Then, plugging in upper and lower bounds for EY0 = P(Y0 = 1) and integrating over Z yields:
EZ
(
P(Y = 1|Z = z)− u0
P(D = 1|Z = z)
)
≤ E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1) ≤ EZ
(
P(Y = 1|Z = z)− l0
P(D = 1|Z = z)
)
,
where l0 and u0 are the respective lower and upper bounds for EY0 in Corollary 4. Symmetrically, we obtain
bounds for E(Y0 − Y1|D = 0).
A.5. Improvement on Peterson bounds. Combining Peterson bounds (3.1) and assuming y12 > y01 and
y02 > y11 yields the following upper bound.
P(y01 < Y0 ≤ y02, y11 < Y1 ≤ y12) = P(Y0 ≤ y02, Y1 ≤ y12)− P(Y0 ≤ y02, Y1 ≤ y11)
−P(Y0 ≤ y01, Y1 ≤ y12) + P(Y0 ≤ y01, Y1 ≤ y11)
≤ P(Y ≤ y02, D = 0) + P(Y ≤ y12, D = 1)
−P(Y ≤ min(y02, y11))
−P(Y ≤ min(y01, y12))
+P(Y ≤ y01, D = 0) + P(Y ≤ y11, D = 1)
= P(y11 < Y ≤ y02, D = 0) + P(y01 < Y ≤ y12, D = 1).
As shown on Figure 3he latter bounds are not sharp. Indeed:
P(y01 < Y0 ≤ y02, y11 < Y1 ≤ y12) = P(y01 < Y0 ≤ y02, y11 < Y1 ≤ y12, Y1 ≤ Y0)
+ P(y01 < Y0 ≤ y02, y11 < Y1 ≤ y12, Y1 > Y0)
≤ P(max(y01, y11) < Y ≤ y02, D = 0)
+ P(max(y01, y11) < Y ≤ y12, D = 1),
obtained from Theorem 3 (or directly), are sharper unless y01 = y11.
A.6. Upper and lower sets. Upper and lower sets from Theorem 3 are illustrated in Figure 4.
A.7. Proof of Theorem 3. The Roy model defined by Assumptions 1 and 2 can be equivalently recast as
a correspondence G : R × {0, 1} ⇒ R2 defined as follows, with the order convention (Y0, Y1) for the pair of
Figure 3. Upper bound for P(y01 < Y0 ≤ y02, y11 < Y1 ≤ y12) represented in R
2. The
lower right-hand triangle corresponds to D = 0 and the upper left triangle to D = 1.
(a)
Re-
gion
(b)
Up-
per
Bound
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Figure 4. Lower and upper sets LA,1, UA,0 and UA,1 for A. LA,0 = ∅.
(a)
Lower
sets
(b)
Up-
per
Sets
unobserved variables. For all y ∈ R,
G(y, 0) = {y} × (−∞, y]
G(y, 1) = (−∞]× {y}.
(A.10)
Indeed, if D = 0, by Assumption 1, Y0 = Y . By Assumption 2, Y1 ≤ Y . Hence the set of values compatible
with the Roy model specification is (Y0, Y1) ∈ {Y } × (−∞, Y ], as in the definition of G. Similarly, if D = 1,
by Assumption 1, Y1 = Y . By Assumption 2, Y0 ≤ Y . Hence the set of values compatible with the Roy
model specification is (Y0, Y1) ∈ (−∞, Y ]× {Y }.
The collection (µ,G, ν), where µ is the joint distribution of the vector (Y,D) of observable variables and ν
is the joint distribution of the vector (Y1, Y0) of unobservable variables, forms a structure in the terminology
of Koopmans and Reiersol (1950) extended by Jovanovic (1989). The correspondence G is non-empty valued
and measurable, in the sense that for any open set O ⊆ R2, G−1(O) := {(y, d) ∈ R×{0, 1} | G(y, d)∩O 6= ∅}
is a Borel measurable subset of R× {0, 1}. Hence Theorem 1 of Galichon and Henry (2011) applies and the
collection of inequalities
µ(A) ≤ ν[G−1(A)], for all Borel measurable A ⊆ R2
define sharp bounds for the joint distribution ν of the unobservable variables (Y1, Y0).
For any Borel measurable A ⊆ R2,
G
−1(A) = {(y, d) ∈ R× {0, 1} | G(y, d) ∩A 6= ∅}
= {(y, 0) | y ∈ UA,0} ∪ {(y, 1) | y ∈ UA,1}.
Hence, µ(A) ≤ ν[G−1(A)] is equivalent to the second inequality in the display of Theorem 1. The first
inequality in that same display is obtained by complementation as follows.
µ(Ac) ≤ ν[G−1(Ac)] ⇒ µ(A) ≥ ν[{(y, d) ∈ R× {0, 1} | G(y, d) ⊆ A)}]
= ν[{(y, 0) | y ∈ LA,0} ∪ {(y, 1) | y ∈ LA,1}]
as required.
A.8. Theorem 4.
A.8.1. Statement of the Theorem.
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(1) Let (Y0, Y1) be an arbitrary pair of random variables. Let Y and D satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2.
Then the distribution functions F1 and F0 of Y1 and Y0 respectively, satisfy
Fd(y2)− Fd(y1) ≥ P(y1 < Y ≤ y2, D = d) + P(Y ≤ y2, D = 1− d)1{y1 = −∞} (A.11)
for d = 0, 1, and for all y1 and y2 in R ∪ {±∞}, such that y1 < y2.
(2) Let Y be an arbitrary random variable and D be a binary random variable. Let F1 and F0 be
right-continuous functions satisfying (A.11). Then there exists a pair (Y1, Y0) with cdfs F1 and F0
respectively, such that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
A.8.2. Proof of Theorem 4.
(1) Validity of the bounds: As shown in the main text, Theorem 1 yields bounds (3.2)-(3.3) and (3.3) is
redundant. Hence the result.
(2) Sharpness of the bounds: Let Y andD be given. Let F1 and F0 be right-continuous functions satisfying
(A.11). We shall construct a pair (Y0, Y1) with cdfs F0 and F1 respectively, such that Assumptions 1 and 2
are satisfied. First, we verify that Fd is a valid cdf for d = 0, 1. (A.11) implies that Fd is non decreasing and
non negative. Fixing y2 and letting y1 → −∞ also yields Fd(−∞) = 0. Finally, letting y2 → +∞ yields
Fd(+∞) = 1.
Define F d with y 7→ F d(y) = P(Y ≤ y,D = d) for each y. Let F
−1 be the generalized inverse, defined as
F
−1(u) = inf{y : F (y) ≥ u}. Let U be a uniform random variable on [0, 1] such that U < P(D = 1)⇔ D = 1.
Define Y0 and Y1 in the following way. When U < P(D = 1), let Y1 = F
−1
1
(U) and Y0 = (F0 − F 0)
−1(U).
The latter is well defined, since U remains in the range of F0 − F 0. Indeed, (A.11) implies
Fd(y) ≥ F d(y) + F 1−d(y), for each y ∈ R. (A.12)
Hence, Fd(y) − F d(y) ≥ P(Y ≤ y,D = 1 − d), hence, in particular, (F0 − F 0)(+∞) ≥ P(D = 1). For
U > P(D = 1), let Y0 = F
−1
0
(U−P(D = 1)) and Y1 = (F1−F 1)
−1(U−P(D = 1)). The latter is well defined
because, as before, (F1 − F 1)(+∞) ≥ P(D = 0).
We first verify Assumption 2. Note first that Assumption 2 is equivalent to D = d ⇒ Yd ≥ Y1−d for
d = 0, 1. Hence, we need to show that U < P(D = 1) ⇒ Y1 ≥ Y0 and U > P(D = 1) ⇒ Y1 ≤ Y0. By
symmetry, we only show the first implication. Suppose U < P(D = 1). If U is a continuity value of F
1
,
then U = F
1
(Y1). By (A.12), F 1 ≤ F0 − F 0. Hence, U = F 1(Y1) ≤ (F0 − F 0)(Y1). So if we can show right-
continuity and monotonicity of Fd − F d, then Y0 = (F0 − F 0)
−1(U) ≤ Y1 as required. Now, monotonicity
of Fd − F d follows immediately from (A.11) and right continuity of Fd − F d from that of Fd and F d. If the
distribution of Y1 has an atom at F
−1
1
(U), then, by right-continuity of F
1
, U ≤ F
1
(Y1) ≤ (F0 − F 0)(Y1), so
that, by right continuity and monotonicity of F0 − F 0, we have Y0 = (F0 − F 0)
−1(U) ≤ Y1 as required.
We now verify Assumption 1. We need to show that for each d = 1, 0, P(Yd ≤ y,D = d) = F d(y). By
symmetry, we only deal with Y1. By monotonicity and right continuity of F 1, F
−1
1
(U) ≤ y ⇔ U ≤ F
1
(y)
(Proposition 1(5) in Embrecht and Hofert (2013)). Hence, we have the following as required.
P(Y1 ≤ y,D = 1) = P(F
−1
1
(U) ≤ y, U < P(D = 1)) = P(U ≤ F
1
(y), U < P(D = 1)) = F
1
(y).
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Finally, we need to verify that Y1 and Y0 do indeed have the announced distributions. We shall show that
the cdf of Y1 is indeed F1. Reasoning as above, we have the following.
P(Y1 ≤ y,D = 0) = P((F1 − F 1)
−1(U − P(D = 1)) ≤ y, U > P(D = 1))
= P(U ≤ (F1 − F 1)(y) + P(D = 1), U < P(D = 1))
= (F1 − F 1)(y).
Therefore P(Y1 ≤ y) = P(Y1 ≤ y,D = 1) + P(Y1 ≤ y,D = 0) = F 1(y) + (F1 − F 1)(y) = F1(y) as required.
A.9. Proof of Proposition 1. Let 0 < q1 < q2 < 1 and let y1 and y2 be the q1 and q2 quantiles of the
distribution of outcomes in Sector d for the self-selected economy. The following holds.
P(Y ≤ y2|D = d)− P(Y ≤ y1|D = d) =
1
P(D = d)
(F d(y2)− F d(y1)) ≥ F d(y2)− F d(y1).
Hence, q2 − q1 ≥ F d(y2)− F d(y1). In addition, for any y ∈ R,
P(Y ≤ y|D = d) =
F d(y)
P(D = d)
= F d(y) + P (D = 1− d)
F d(y)
P(D = d)
≤ F d(y).
Finally, under the stochastic dominance condition, F (yj) = P(Y ≤ yj) ≤ P(Y ≤ yj |D = d) for j = 0, 1.
Since the sharp upper bound for the (q1, q2)-interquantile range of the distribution of Yd is given by
IQR(q1, q2, Fd) = max

y2 − y1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
F (y1) ≤ q1 ≤ F d(y1),
F (y2) ≤ q2 ≤ F d(y2),
q2 − q1 ≥ F d(y2)− F d(y1),


these three inequalities imply that the interquantile range y2−y1 satisfies the sharp bounds on the interquan-
tile range for the distribution of Yd.
However, if we relax the first order stochastic dominance condition, we now show that there exist situa-
tions, where the interquantile range in Sector d under self-selection is strictly larger than the upper bound for
the corresponding interquantile range of the distribution of potential outcomes under random assignment.
Let P(Y ≤ y) be continuous. Let y02 be defined by P(Y ≤ y02, D = d)+P(D = 1−d) = q2. Finally, suppose
that D = 1− d ⇒ Y ≤ y02, so that P(Y ≤ y) coincides with P(Y ≤ y,D = d) + P(D = 1− d) on the right
of y02. Then the upper bound for the interquantile range of Yd is F d(q2 − P(D = d))− F d(q1 − P(D = d)),
which can be made lower than the interquantile range for Y |D = d, namely P(D = d) (F d(q2)− F d(q1)),
with a suitable choice of slope for P(Y ≤ y,D = d).
Appendix B. Empirical methodology
This section gives the details of the inference procedures used to compute the various confidence
regions presented in the paper. A guide to implementation of the clrbound Stata Package is given
in Chernozhukov, Kim, Lee, and Rosen (2013).
B.1. Binary Roy model. We first construct four sub-samples based on gender and the degree
type (Bachelor or Masters/PhD). Then, we conduct inference using the clrbound Stata Package
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including the following covariates: region, age at graduation, size of the governmental student loan,
experience before enrolment, and being from a visible minority. The father’s education level is used
as an instrument Z, i.e., a variable that affects sector selection but not outcomes conditional on
the sector. Since the suport of the instrument is finite, the procedure is almost identical to Nevo
and Rosen (2012). We proceed as follows. First, we run the clrbound command for the vector of
functions θi(z), i = 1, . . . , 8, defined by:
θ1(z) = P(Y = 1|Z = z),
θ2(z) = P(Y = 0|Z = z),
θ3(z) = P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z) + P(Y = 0, D = 1|Z = z),
θ4(z) = P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = z) + P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z),
θ5(z) = P(Y = 1, D = 0|Z = z),
θ6(z) = P(Y = 0, D = 0|Z = z),
θ7(z) = P(Y = 1, D = 1|Z = z),
θ8(z) = P(Y = 0, D = 1|Z = z).
The clrbound command delivers a vector of estimates (θˆi(z))i=1,...,8, a vector of standard errors
(sˆi(z))i=1,...,8 at each z ∈ Supp(Z), and the critical value k > 0 at the desired level 1 − α. Note
that k is independent of i and z. Second, we compute Qi := inf{ θˆi(z) + k × sˆi(z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)}
for each i = 1, . . . , 4 and Q¯i := sup{ θˆi(z) − k × sˆi(z) : z ∈ Supp(Z)} for each i = 5, . . . , 8. Finally,
we compute the confidence intervals according to the formulae in the main text. For instance,
[max(Q¯5, 1−Q2−Q4),min(1−Q¯6,Q1+Q3)] is a valid confidence region for EY0, since sup
z
θ5(z) ≥ Q¯5,
inf
z
θ2(z) ≤ Q2, inf
z
θ4(z) ≤ Q4, inf
z
θ6(z) ≤ Q6, sup
z
θ1(z) ≥ Q¯1 and sup
z
θ3(z) ≥ Q¯3 jointly imply that
max(sup
z
θ5(z), 1 − inf
z
θ2(z)− inf
z
θ4(z)) ≥ max(Q¯5, 1 − Q2 − Q4) and min(1 − inf
z
θ6(z), sup
z
θ1(z) +
sup
z
θ3(z)) ≤ min(1− Q¯6,Q1 +Q3).
The average chosen sector advantage requires an additional step. Recall that:
EZ
(
P(Y = 1|Z = z)− u0
P(D = 1|Z = z)
)
≤ E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1) ≤ EZ
(
P(Y = 1|Z = z)− l0
P(D = 1|Z = z)
)
,
where l0 and u0 are, respectively, the lower and upper bound for EY0. We plug in for l0 and u0 the
lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval for EY0. We then use the canonical bootstrap
to retrieve the 95% confidence region of the plug-in estimators (the upper and the lower bound).
B.2. Continuous outcomes.
Lower bound for the interquantile range (IQR). In each gender and degree subsample, we obtain an
estimate for F−1(q1) with a quantile regression of Y , and for F
−1
d (q2) with a quantile regression of
Y¯d ( equal to Y if D = d and 0 otherwise). We use the canonical bootstrap to obtain the critical
value for the difference and report the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval if the latter is
positive, and 0 if negative.
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Upper bound for the IQR. In each gender and degree subsample, we compute
ˆIQR(y) = min
(
Fˆ−1(q2)− y, Fˆ
−1
d (q2 − q1 + Fˆ d(y))− y
)
,
where hats indicate sample analogues, and Fˆ
−1
d is obtained from a quantile regression of Y d (equal
to Y if D = d and +∞ otherwise) on q2 − q1 + Yˆ d(y). The supremum will be taken over y in
Supp(y) := [Fˆ
−1
d (q1) − llnl; Fˆ
−1(q2) + llnu], where llnl is a proportional to
√
ln ln(n)/n × sˆl, sˆl
is the standard deviation of Fˆ
−1
d (q1), and llnu is defined accordingly. Then, we use the canonical
bootstrap to obtain the variance-covariance matrix of the vector ( ˆIQR(y))y∈G, where G is a grid on
Supp(y). This variance-covariance matrix will be used in a simulation step to obtain the appropriate
critical value cα to be used for the CLR correction. The upper bound of the confidence region for
IQR(Fd) is given by:
max
y∈G
(
ˆIQR(y) + cα × sd( ˆIQR(y))
)
,
where sd( ˆIQR(y)) is the bootstrapped standard deviation of the corresponding estimator.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Graduates from NGS 2010
Male Female
Non-STEM STEM Non-STEM STEM
Observations 1,626 993 3,585 567
(As % male/female pop.) 62.08 37.92 86.34 13.66
Degree (% by Major)
Bachelor 63.84 61.13 62.71 50.62
Masters/PhD 36.16 38.87 37.29 49.38
Age at Graduation (% by Major)
below 25 41.33 46.42 43.12 51.68
25 to 29 yrs old 28.78 34.14 28.01 31.22
30 to 34 yrs old 19.43 15.91 16.43 12.52
35 and above 10.46 3.52 12.44 4.59
Experience and Job char. (% by Major)
Worked before Enrollment 48.22 33.33 48.56 31.57
Permanent Job 79.27 81.87 76.46 71.08
Related Job 80.19 89.33 84.18 84.13
Fathers Education (% by Major)
Less than high school 12.55 8.46 15.34 10.23
High school 24.17 24.07 25.05 21.69
Trade certificate or diploma 8.36 8.26 10.96 8.99
College, CEGEP, non-university 12.18 13.6 12.44 12.52
Up to and including Bachelors 27.69 28.48 22.09 29.10
Above the Bachelors 17.47 17.93 14.77 17.46
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics - 1996 and 2011 Censuses
Male Female
Non-STEM STEM Non-STEM STEM
1996 Observations 14,416 4,883 15,193 972
Age below 40 5,022 2,000 6,861 572
Wage distribution in 2010 CAD
First Quartile 44,054 53,691 34,417 38,547
Median 67,458 74,341 53,691 55,067
Second Quartile 86,814 96,368 70,211 72,990
IQR 42,760 42,677 35,794 34,443
2011 Observations 18,877 7,828 27,898 3,264
Age below 40 5,850 2,732 10,881 1,439
Wage distribution in 2010 CAD
First Quartile 45,000 54,000 38,000 38,000
Median 71,000 80,000 59,000 61,000
Second Quartile 110,000 100,000 80,000 84,000
IQR 55,000 56,000 42,000 46,000
Figure 5. Effect of the father’s education on the proportion of STEM
among women with a Masters or a PhD in the Western Provinces
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
P
(D
=
1
)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Father's education
Adjusted Predictions of fathedp
Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age
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Figure 6. Bounds on the probability of finding a permanent job
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Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; Debt owed to
the government > 25, 000$. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters
or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia and the Territories.
Figure 7. Bounds on the probability of finding a permanent job, no student debt
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Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; No student
debt owed to the government. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a
Masters or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
British Columbia and the Territories.
Figure 8. Bounds on the probability of finding a permanent job, visible minorities
Atlantic Quebec Ontario Western
0.25
0.5
0.75
B
a
c
h
e
l
o
r
Atlantic Quebec Ontario Western
0.25
0.5
0.75
M
a
s
t
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
P
h
D
 
 
NO STEM STEM
(a) Men
Atlantic Quebec Ontario Western
0.25
0.5
0.75
B
a
c
h
e
l
o
r
Atlantic Quebec Ontario Western
0.25
0.5
0.75
M
a
s
t
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
P
h
D
 
 
NO STEM STEM
(b) Women
Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; Debt owed to
the government > 25, 000$. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters
or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia and the Territories.
Figure 9. Bounds on the probability of finding a job related to the field of study
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Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; Debt owed to
the government > 25, 000$. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters
or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia and the Territories.
Figure 10. Chosen sector advantage in finding a permanent job
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(b) Women
Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; Debt owed to
the government > 25, 000$. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters
or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia and the Territories.
Figure 11. Chosen sector advantage in finding a permanent job, no student debt
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(b) Women
Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; No student
debt owed to the government. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a
Masters or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
British Columbia and the Territories.
Figure 12. Chosen sector advantage in finding a permanent job, visible minorities
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(b) Women
Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; Debt owed to
the government > 25, 000$. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters
or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia and the Territories.
Figure 13. Chosen sector advantage in finding a job related to the field of study
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(b) Women
Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; Debt owed to
the government > 25, 000$. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters
or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British
Figure 14. Bounds on absolute and relative advantage in finding a permanent job
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(b) Women
Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; Debt owed to
the government > 25, 000$. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters
or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia and the Territories. For each panel and each province, the left bar is the quantity P (Y1 > Y0), the middle bar is the quantity
P (D = 1), and the right bar is the quantity P (Y1 ≥ Y0).
Figure 15. Bounds on absolute and relative advantage in finding a job related to the field of study
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(b) Women
Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; Debt owed to
the government > 25, 000$. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters
or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia and the Territories. For each panel and each province, the left bar is the quantity P (Y1 > Y0), the middle bar is the quantity
P (D = 1), and the right bar is the quantity P (Y1 ≥ Y0).
Figure 16. Bounds on absolute and relative advantage with new STEM definition
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(b) Women
Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation < 30; No previous experience; Debt owed to
the government > 25, 000$. The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters
or PhD degree. Confidence interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. Provinces are on the X-axis. “Atlantic” groups Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island. “Western” groups Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia and the Territories. The new definition of STEM excludes physical and life sciences. For each panel and each province, the
left bar is the quantity P (Y1 > Y0), the middle bar is the quantity P (D = 1), and the right bar is the quantity P (Y1 ≥ Y0).
Figure 17. Bounds on the probability of each income tranche for Ontario female graduates
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(b) 2011
Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation between 30 and 34; Not visible minority.
The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters or PhD degree. Confidence
interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. The figure shows bounds on the probability of each income tranche for the potential
wage distributions of female STEM and non-STEM graduates.
Figure 18. Bounds on the interquantile range for the disrtibution of wages of Ontario female graduates
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Note: The conditional distribution is evaluated at the following values: Age at graduation between 30 and 34; Not visible minority.
The top panel is for individuals with a Bachelor degree. The bottom panel is for individual with a Masters or PhD degree. Confidence
interval are calculated at 95% confidence level. For each province, from left to right: bounds on the interquartile range of the potential
non-STEM, observed non-STEM, observed STEM, and potential STEM female wage distribution.
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